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ABSTRACT 
 
Korsgaard (2009) argues, against Kolodny (2005) and Broome (2007), that rational 
requirements are in fact normative. In her view the normativity of rational requirements is 
a function of their constitutive role in the deliberative activity of reason. After surveying 
the treatment of this question in the relevant literature, I explain Korsgaard's theory using 
pure constructivism as a framing device. I then argue that not only is her account of 
deliberative reason as an activity unsatisfactory (specifically, it fails to defeat the intuition 
that charges of boot-strapping are deeply problematic, and makes the adoption of reasons 
for belief from the deliberative perspective a function of an agent's commitment to 
principles and not of her seeing the belief as true), but that she is unable to account for 
the normativity of rationality (because her theory is unable to provide an answer that 
avoids regress or is not trivial to her own “normative question” when it takes a rational 
requirement as its object). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Why should I not violate modus ponens?”  This question can be asked more generally as 
well: “why must I obey standards of rationality?” In everyday discourse one often hears 
rebukes that express a similar idea:“You need to think straight...” or “you should think 
more carefully...” Philosophers tend to frame such protests differently, but there is a 
crucial feature common to such utterances. Namely, they purport to be normative; they    
express the idea that we ought to think in some ways rather than others, or suggest that 
some ways of thinking are better than others, and that correspondingly, it is wrong or 
incorrect to think in ways that stray from sanctioned modes
1
. The practices of praise and 
blame surrounding how we think are a central feature not only of our intellectual 
endeavors, but inform how we live and interact more generally. This is to say that a 
concern with the apparent normativity of thought is not solely a philosophical question.  
              I will be concerned with the nature of rationality. When one thinks as one 
should, we often say that one is rational, and when one goes awry, we tend to say that one 
is irrational.
2
 There are exceptions. The poet at work on completing a stanza is not 
usefully instructed to think rationally, we might say, nor is she aptly criticized for failure 
to adhere to the canons or standards of that phenomenon. At least some artistic creation is 
                                                 
1
 One might say: from the sanctioned patterns. This, though, would be to frontload a controversial point 
that should be settled only by substantive debate - that is, it is not obvious that thinking rationally ought 
to be construed as thinking that instantiates some sanctioned pattern. 
2
 The matter is a great deal more nuanced than this crude surmisal suggests. 
2 
aptly characterized as thought, and whether this kind of thought is evaluable in terms of 
rational or irrational appraisal is a question to be answered elsewhere.
3
 But there is reason 
to think that the character of even artistic thinking is not entirely insulated from 
rationality. The poet, for example, sees that the line she just composed has a stilted 
metaphor, one that could be interpreted in a way that runs counter to the general themes 
of the poem. If after composing this line the poet judges it to have a stilted metaphor that 
undercuts the theme of the poem yet keeps it, despite believing that the resulting poem 
will not be as good a poem as it would be without it, then we have the intuition that it is 
fitting to call her irrational. Laying such thoughts aside, “Why should I be rational?” or 
alternatively, “why should I think rationally?”4  will be the general guiding questions for 
this study. 
              In “The Activity of Reason” (2009), Korsgaard sketches an account of 
theoretical reason similar her view of practical reason.
5
 Reason is an activity undertaken 
by creatures with a special sort of awareness, and has its origin in the “reflective 
distance” that each person occupies with respect to the representations that purport to 
                                                 
3
 This of course presupposes some conception of thought. But it does make perfect sense to speak of 
artists as subject to rational appraisal (in the sense of that term whose contrast class is irrational rather 
than non-rational) – if the poet aims to write a poem about grief and identity and in order to accomplish 
this only sketches drawings of ukelele's (while steadfastly maintaining that she wants and plans to write 
a poem), then we have reason to think of her as behaving irrationally. Likewise with the akratic poet 
who never sets pen to paper despite her avowal to write her masterpiece. 
4
 My primary reason for framing the issue of the normativity of rationality in precisely these terms is 
strategic (as I discuss later). Korsgaard herself urges that this is the “normative question”, and a domain 
must answer it if it is to be counted as normative for the person to whom the domain applies. There are 
different ways to put this question depending on which normative concept one takes as one's figure: 
“Why ought I to be rational/think rationally”, “Why must I think rationally”, “Why is it good to be 
rational and bad to be irrational”? These questions have different import, and I do not mean to suggest 
that they can be substituted for one another with no change in meaning. The point here is that each asks 
of rationality why it has normative standing for us. This said, the use of evaluatives rather than 
directives in the question really doesn't seem to purport to guide one's actions or attitudes, at least 
insofar as one thinks of the evaluatives as non-action guiding. Such a view is not universally held. 
5
 The view of practical reason she defends in Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. We will 
see later that for Korsgaard the two are, ultimately, aspects of a single phenomenon. 
3 
count in favor of adopting belief (or performing an action). The activity of reason consists 
in the construction of a unified conception of the world and the constitution of a unified 
subject that forms beliefs about that world through the application of rational principles.
6
 
These principles are constitutive principles of the activity of reason, and so rationality is 
normative because it is defined by the set of principles we must use to engage in the 
activity of reason. 
  In this thesis I will criticize both Korsgaard's conception of the nature of reason 
and rational principles, and her also account of why they are normative. Although her 
presentation is not completely developed, I think that it is developed enough to see that it 
is headed in the wrong direction. This project, then, is primarily negative. It is positive in 
a few respects however. First, it is in the process of trying to develop Korsgaard's view of 
reason and specify the principles of rationality that we will see the implausibility of her 
approach. It will also hopefully have an additional positive payoff of illustrating the 
contours of the discussion of reason and rationality, clarifying what is at stake in them, 
and show at least one way not to conceive of the domain. 
        In the first chapter I will lay groundwork for the subsequent discussion, and briefly 
characterize differing ways of articulating what I call the domain of rationality in the 
literature.
7
 Next I will establish a rough taxonomy for classifying accounts of rationality 
as a specific phenomenon (as structural views, process views, and mirroring views). 
Finally, I will clarify the sense of normativity in question.  
                                                 
6
 It is a consequence of her view that theoretical and practical reason are really dimensions of a single 
activity, since it is the application of practical rational principles unifies us as agents. For ease, I will 
sometimes refer to the activity of reason, in Korsgaard's technical sense, as “rational activity”. 
7
 Specifically focusing on whose who articulate it into the concepts of  “substantive reason”, “reason” (as 
a faculty), and rationality (as an achievement). I take this way of describing rationality from Jason 
Bridges. 
4 
          The second chapter will be devoted to characterizing Korsgaard's account of reason 
and rational standards. I will contrast her view to that of John Broome (1998, 2009), 
whose claims that rationality consists in a set of wide-scope normative requirement, a 
first-order model of reasoning, and connection between the two.  
           In the third chapter I will present a number of objections to Korsgaard's account, 
organized along two axes: against her conception of reason and rationality, and also 
against her conception of the normativity of these rational principles. After drawing 
attention to a significant tension  between Aristotelian and Kantian approaches
8
 to 
normativity latent in her view,  along the first axis I will present the objection from 
incoherence and the objection from diversity.  Along the second axis, I will criticize 
explanation of the normativity of these principles by presenting the objections from the 
incompatibility of constitutivity and normativity and from rule-following skepticism. As  
suggested earlier, these objections will be brought out in the attempt to plausibly 
reconstruct Korsgaard's position. The argumentative strategy is to show that even  
developing it as charitably as possible, Korsgaard's view is unsatisfactory. 
          The issue of the normativity of rationality is sufficiently deep and expansive to be 
given thesis-length treatment alone. But given the close relation between rationality and 
reason in the history philosophy, an affinity clearly present in Korsgaard's work, to 
address one independently is certainly to present an incomplete view of the issue at hand. 
In Korsgaard's view it is true that a person is rational in virtue of her applying rational 
principles in the deliberative activity of reason. What is of further concern is in virtue of 
                                                 
8
 Although, as we will see, these will not be strictly Aristotelian or Kantian approaches, but rather 
developments of those approaches. 
5 
what it is true that one should or ought to be rational and apply these principles. This 
question, we will see, poses a difficulty for Korsgaard's constructivism. Korsgaard has 
said that normativity of a given domain or subject can be expressed in its ability to 
provide an answer to the “normative question” of “why should I y?” Adopting this as the 
guiding question enables us to see whether Korsgaard's own view can answer the 
normative question, and so satisfy itself. It is, therefore, of signal importance that her 
account be able to answer it when it is applied to the activity of reason. I will urge that it 
cannot, because the very possibility of asking whether I ought to satisfy rational 
principles entails that I engage in the deliberative activity of reason and so adhere rational 
principles. 
          Korsgaard writes that in her view,  
 “...it makes perfectly good sense for us to say, both to ourselves and to each 
 other, that because you believe both P and that P implies Q, you ought to 
 believe Q...it is a reminder of the normative commitments that are 
 constitutive of taking a certain kind of action, in this case mental action – 
 believing something, that is, representing the world to yourself in a certain 
 way”. (2009, 34) 
 
In what follows I will illustrate the line of thought that she takes to justify this claim, and 
urge that it is mistaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
1  RATIONALITY IN WHAT SENSE? 
 
1.1  The term “rational” and its cognates are predicated of a wide variety of objects, some 
of which appear to have little in common with each other. In our everyday talk we speak 
of rational people, rational plans, rational decisions, rational choice – the sense of the 
term has as great a variety as the number of nouns that can be modified by the adjective 
“rational.”  In philosophy, the term is most often predicated of attitudes (such as beliefs 
and desires) and patterns of thought, but is also attached to less traditional objects (such 
as societies). 
              Some argue that the concept of rationality is concerned with the relations that 
obtain between the attitudes of some subject.
9
 Specifically, one is rational if one's 
attitudes realize a certain set of relations or, rather, do not realize some impermissible set 
of relations – coherence, that all of one's attitudes can be true simultaneously, is a prime 
example of such a requirement.
10
 Others think that rationality is concerned with what one 
has reason to believe. Specifically, one is rational if one's attitudes track the reasons that 
there are, or if one has the attitudes that there are reasons for one to have.  
              Other concepts are closely related to the concept of rationality, and must figure 
into a presentation of that phenomenon. Specifically, these are the concepts substantive 
                                                 
9
 Scanlon (1998) 
10
 It is also, if strictly construed, far too stringent. The amount of intellectual energy needed to root out all 
contradictory attitudes is greater than most people who would intuitively count as rational can muster. A 
weakened requirement would be preferable, namely one that says that one endeavors to maximize the 
coherence of one's attitudes when possible. 
7 
reason, and reason as a faculty. For sake of clarity, I will refer to the concepts of 
substantive reason, reasons, and rationality collectively as the domain of rationality. This 
will help keep matters clear when discussing the relationship between the domain of 
rationality and normativity, and specifically the differing explanatory approaches adopted 
by philosophers regarding the two domains. It is important to adopt such terminology 
insofar as many philosophers analyze normativity using the concepts that belong to 
domain of rationality.   
          
1.2  I will begin by introducing the concept of substantive reason. At the most general 
level what I will call a “substantive reason” is typically understood to be a consideration 
that counts in favor of some action or attitude.11 This use of the word needs to be 
distinguished from the term “reason” as it appears in sentences of the following sort: “the 
reason that you have such back pain is the pressure on your sciatic nerve”. That use of the 
term is broadly explanatory, and in a great many cases can be substituted for the word 
“explanation”. As a result it is typically called an “explanatory reason”. What explanatory 
reasons consist in is a matter of dispute, but most argue that they are either propositions 
or facts. 
          The sense of “reason” that is of primary concern here is different from this 
explanatory sense. Its character can be seen in sentences of the following sort: “but you 
had no reason to mislead him about the contents of the will”. This is this sense of reason 
that is typically glossed as “counting in favor”. It purports to guide one in action or in the 
                                                 
11
 I follow Korsgaard's terminology here. Scanlon (1998) urges that we have reasons for attitudes only;  
Bridges objects that we can have reasons for actions as well as attitudes. (2007)  
8 
acquisition of attitude, and in accordance with this intuition is sometimes called a 
normative reason
12
.  But, as has been noted often, normative reasons also do explanatory 
work
13
. In saying why my brother bought a gift for our mother I cite his reason for doing 
so – it was her birthday. That it was her birthday was a reason for him to buy her the gift 
to be sure and so was a normative reason, but citing it as his reason explains his action.  
            It should be noted that one can cite what is perceived by an agent to be a 
normative reason for action or attitude to explain her performance of that action or 
adoption of that attitude while not seeing the normative reason that the individual takes 
herself to have as a reason, all things considered. My brother might have thought that he 
had reason to buy our mother a gift on those Thursdays that he trips over his bedroom 
slippers and drops his toothbrush in the toilet; as it happens, this Thursday both of these 
conditions obtained and it also happened to be our mother's birthday. So we explain his 
action by citing his perceived normative reason, yet do not grant that his reason is a good 
one. This is to say that the phrase “for the reason that” which appears in explanations of 
the sort need not be factive. One may act on what one takes to be a reason, but be 
mistaken about whether it is a reason.
14
 
            The concept of a substantive reason is believed by some to resist analysis or 
eliminative definition.
15 
Attempts to define the concept often invoke concepts that are 
sufficiently similar to substantive reason as to be uninformative, or concepts that can 
                                                 
12
 The nature of the relation between explanatory and normative reasons (or, alternatively, between 
explanatory and normative uses of the word reason) is contested and not as neat as this crude sketch 
suggests: most obviously, what we are inclined to call normative reasons also explain, e.g. “the reason 
he made dinner at home tonight was in order to feed his children.”  
13
 Raz (2007) 
14
 See Setiya (2003) 
15
 Scanlon (1998), Raz (2007) 
9 
themselves  be understood only in terms of substantive reasons. For example, Scanlon 
(1998) urges that a reason is a “consideration that counts in favor” of something. (1998, 
17) But when one wants to know how it counts in favor of that thing, one will be able to 
say little else other than “by being a reason for it”. Scanlon does think we can say what 
sorts of things reasons are, though, even if we are unable to provide an illuminating 
analysis of the concept: they are a four-place relation that figures into normative 
judgments. This sort of primitivism about substantive reasons is not widely held, 
though.
16 
Joseph Raz, for example, urges that substantive reasons are facts that have a 
characteristic function, namely to “provide[s] the answer to questions about the reason 
why things are as they are, become what they become, or to any other reason-why 
question...”. (2007, 2) On this view, substantive reasons have an essentially explanatory 
purpose – all substantive reasons are explanatory, but some are explanatory as well as 
normative. Since he takes substantive reasons to be explanatory, Raz rejects the notion, 
defended by some, that reasons are propositions. This is because propositions can be 
false, and false propositions do not explain. So if reasons were propositions then we 
would be in the uncomfortable position of having to show what false propositions explain 
or justify, or else provide some ground to count only true propositions as reasons.  
           For Raz, a normative reason is “a fact which gives a point or a purpose to one's 
action, and the action is undertaken for the sake or in pursuit of that point or purpose” 
(2007, 1) Scanlon would perhaps reject this suggestion because it seems possible for 
something to give point or purpose (either from the agent's perspective or objectively) to 
                                                 
16
 Scanlon offers “buck-passing” accounts of other normative concepts such as “good”, meaning they are 
to be analyzed without remainder in terms of reasons. 
10 
an action without being a reason for it.
17
 What is to the point, though, is the fact that both 
Raz and Scanlon are realists about reasons. This means, minimally, that normative facts 
or truths about what there is reason to believe or do exist independent of our intellectual 
practices. It is not a condition on realism of this sort, though, that reasons are absolutely 
independent of reasoners in the sense that if there were no reasoners there would still be 
reasons. Most plausible forms of realism construe reasons as relations that obtain 
between people and attitudes or actions that do not persist in the absence of one of the 
relata. 
           Intuitively, the concept of a substantive reason is one of the fundamental 
normative concepts, but it has company: good, bad, ought, should, and must are all 
normative terms that pervade philosophical as well as everyday discourse. Judith 
Thomson has drawn attention to a general distinction between two kinds of normative 
concepts, the evaluatives (of which good and bad  are examples) and the directives (of 
which ought, must, should are examples). It will be useful to keep this distinction in mind 
because philosophers of normativity often urge that one kind is primary and that the other 
can be analyzed in terms of it.
18 
The normative concepts at work in our guiding question 
will be 'should' or 'ought'. As will be seen later, Korsgaard disagrees with Scanlon and 
Raz that substantive reasons are the fundamental normative concept, or at least urge that 
they are not the sole fundamental normative concept.    
 
                                                 
17
 For Scanlon (2009) reasons are a relation that forms the essence of normative judgment. “R (p,c,a): p is 
a reason for an agent in circumstances c to do a”.   
18
 Of those who give priority to the evaluatives: Richard Kraut (2007), G.E. Moore ( 1903, 1966), J.J.T 
Thompson (2008), Talbot Brewer (2010). 
11 
1.3  With the notion of substantive reasons in view, we must now turn to rationality and 
reason. On the one hand, to say of something that it is rational or it has reason is to say of 
some entity that its mind has the property of being active in a way that other entities are 
not. This is usually thought of as a faculty or capacity that distinguishes some entities, 
namely humans, from others. Humans, the line of thought goes, are distinctive by virtue 
of the fact that they have the faculty of reason. There are a few activities that intuitively 
fall under the scope of this faculty. Historically, drawing inferences and computing 
quantities have been identified as activities conditioned by this faculty or capacity and 
distinctive of it. 
             Perhaps as a more fundamental level, the capacity to respond to reasons as 
reasons has been introduced as that ability which distinguishes rational creatures from 
non-rational creatures, and is the core of this faculty sense of reason.
19
 We need not argue 
that humans always respond to reasons as reasons, but only that at least some humans 
have the ability to do so. And there is reason to doubt that any non-human animals 
respond to reasons as reasons. The contrast class of reason and rationality in this sense is 
non-rational. I will call this faculty-sense “reason” to distinguish it from “substantive 
reason”. We will see later that this general characterization of the phenomenon is not 
congenial to Korsgaard– the faculty of reason is not aptly characterized as a 
responsiveness at all, in her view.  
              But there is also rationality in the sense of that term which has irrational, rather 
                                                 
19
 McDowell (2009) For example, a Scottish terrier might respond to the charging mastiff by scooting 
under the porch where mastiff cannot fit. It seems natural to say of this event that the mastiff was a 
reason for the terrier to scoot under the porch, and that the terrier responded to the reason. But we 
would not say that the terrier responded to the reason as what it was, namely, a reason.  
12 
than non-rational,  as a contrast class. Only rational creatures in the first sense can be 
rational in this second sense. Rationality in the second sense signifies a positive 
achievement, and something earns that status just in case it is able to conform to a 
specific set of conditions. Typically these conditions are taken to be rules or 
requirements. What is included in this set of rules is a matter of surprising agreement; 
some usual suspects are the rules of  logic (both deductive inference and the probability 
calculus), evidentiary standards, and canons of belief formation.
20
  
           Since some draw substantive distinctions between the nature of rules and 
principles, I will call them the standards of rationality to remain as neutral as possible: to 
call them rules or principles of rationality runs the risk of presupposing a contentious 
view of their nature that should be settled only by substantive debate.  
           We can introduce a rough distinction between structural views of rationality, 
process views of rationality, and mirroring views of rationality. The first suggests that one 
is rational if and only if one's attitudes and actions instantiate a specific structure, 
articulated in terms of the relations of one's attitudes to one another. John Broome's 
position, which will be discussed at length later, is an example of this view. A process 
view suggests that one is rational if and only if one adheres to some process in acquiring 
or jettisoning attitudes and in determining whether to perform (or not perform) some 
action. Mirroring views, such as that of Gibbard, suggest that one is rational if and only if 
one's attitudes and actions are the attitudes and actions that one has most reason to have. 
                                                 
20
 In Rational Choice Theory an ideal or standard of rationality is a complete ordinal preference structure 
(this is a standard of rationality relied on heavily by economists). I think this actually not a standard of 
rationality – surely one should not be counted as irrational for not having an ordinal preference between 
two equally horrific choices.  
  
13 
Each of these general views can be expressed in terms of a set of standards or 
requirements. An example of a structural requirement (with a wide-scope) defended by 
John Broome is modus ponens: rationality requires that (if you believe p and if p then q 
you have attitude q). Another widely held standard of rationality that is strongly structural 
can be found in so-called “rational choice theory”, where an individual is considered 
rational only if her preferences have a complete ordinal structure. 
             An example of a general process view of rationality can be found in Ayer's 
Language, Truth, and Logic: “to be rational is simply to employ a self-consistent 
accredited procedure in the formation of all of one's beliefs...” (1952, 100) where a 
procedure counts as accredited just in case it is at that time taken with good reason to be 
reliable (which is revisable).  
           There are of course positions within this general scheme that can be plausibly 
described as belonging to more than one view. If adopted in pure form and taken in 
isolation, each of these three approaches would perhaps be implausible (counter-
examples to each are ready to hand). It is more useful, then, to think of each as 
dimensions in accordance with which a given view of rationality can be understood. 
Bayesians, for example, believe that one is rational just in case one applies Bayes' Rule to 
update the prior probabilities assigned to one's beliefs in light of new evidence. For the 
Bayesian, rationality just is cleaving, through reiterated application, to Bayes' Rule. This 
conception of rationality integrates both structural and process dimensions: the assigning 
of prior probabilities to some beliefs will require that the probabilities assigned to other 
beliefs be adjusted. The Bayesian position regarding rationality is therefore geared 
towards the relations that obtain between our belief (namely the relationships between 
14 
their prior probabilities) and so has a significant structural component, but insofar as it 
requires application of Bayes' Rule in the forming of beliefs, also has some degree of 
process involvement as well.
21
 
              
1.4  An additional point must be noted. The guiding questions about the normativity of 
rationality include “why is it wrong to violate modus ponens?” or alternatively, “why 
ought one to adhere to modus ponens?”, where modus ponens is a specific instance of a 
rational standard. It must be borne in mind that the question of the normativity of 
rationality at issue here is distinct from the idea that rationality has requirements that one 
can fail to satisfy. That one can intelligibly fail to be rational (not just fall in a contrast 
class) shows that rationality is normative in some minimal sense. But that this is true does 
not vindicate the normativity of rationality in the more robust sense in view when we ask 
“why should one not violate modus ponens” and “why should I satisfy modus ponens?” 
Consider an analogy that brings this out (and that is also indicative of Korsgaard's general 
approach). 
             Chess has rules. But the rules of chess are special: they area also constitutive 
standards or requirements. For example, it is a rule of chess that a player cannot legally 
move her knight diagonally across the chessboard; neither can she attack by forward 
movement with a pawn. But this rule of chess is also a standard of what chess is. Chess is 
defined by the set of its rules. It is not the case that one is playing chess badly in moving 
the knight diagonally, but rather that that move is not a chess-move at all – one is not 
                                                 
21
 Weberian Zweckrationalitat is a rational requirement which says that one should always maximize the 
results one is after while minimizing the cost to oneself. This is an instrumental rational requirement. 
15 
playing chess in that case. This of course has nothing to do with the medium in which the 
particular game is realized. One can play chess with shoes or stones or ravens or writing 
desks: the game itself is matter-invariant.
22
 
               The same is true of some other games. A batter cannot legally bypass first base 
by running past the pitcher straight to second. Games have requirements that are 
standards of correctness that are constitutive of the game itself. We can think of the 
moves in chess as normative in the following, minimal sense: one can misplace a chess 
piece. This can be contrasted with, say, simply throwing stones as a way to pass the time. 
I might hit a walnut tree, or I might hit the rhododendron on the other side of the road, 
and so on. But there is no way to fail at throwing stones in the same way that one can fail 
in moving a chess piece.  
             Rules in this sense are a priori regulative of a practice, and if some move fails to 
conform to the rule it is not the rule that is discredited but rather the move. The rule 
remains in force even in particular cases in which it is violated. So too with positive laws. 
Their direction of fit is “mind to world” -  if one violates a traffic law one is not entitled 
to say “well I suppose it was not really a law after all”. This is different from an empirical 
generalization, of which the so-called laws of nature are paradigmatic examples. In these 
cases, if the behavior of the entities described by the law violate that law, then we are 
licensed to say that it was not really a law at all - it does not remain “in force”. 
            But it doesn't seem to be true that the requirements of chess are normative in a 
                                                 
22
 Searle (1996) makes this distinction in terms of convention and rule. It is a convention that chess is 
played using pieces of a particular shape and material constitution. It is a constitutive rule, however, 
that, for example, one must advance one's knight along an L-shaped path (and likewise with other 
rules). 
16 
sense that would underwrite the following command “you ought to move your knight in a 
L-shaped path” even if you are not playing chess, and certainly not “one ought to play 
chess”. One is not under any requirement expressible in the language of “ought” or 
“should” to satisfy the rules of chess if one is not playing chess. The same is true of 
baseball: it is not the case that I ought to run to first base if I am not playing baseball.  
            The point appears to generalize. What is it to say that I ought to satisfy modus 
ponens? If I am not interested in thinking rationally, the line of thought goes, then I am 
under no requirement to satisfy modus ponens. It is precisely this line of thought that has 
hamstrung so many theorists about the normativity of rationality.
23
 We have seen a short 
version of Korsgaard's answer to this problem: if there as an analogy to be drawn 
between games and rationality, it is that the standards of rationality are necessary to 
engage in deliberation at all. How she comes to this answer, and whether she gives it 
adequate support, is the task ahead. 
            As an example of how rationality as a set of standards can be conceived such that 
they are normative in the minimal sense just mentioned, consider Rawls' distinction 
between two sorts of rules.
24
 His concern in that famous paper is to show that the 
utilitarian principle has application only to the justification of practices as a whole, not to 
the particular actions that fall within a given practice. These actions are of a different sort. 
Insofar as they fall under a specific sort of rule they have a different structure from the 
sort of action that is the concern of utilitarian theory. 
 A practice rule is a rule that is “logically prior” to the cases to which it applies. 
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 Some, Kolodny (2005) for example, simply reject the idea that rationality is normative. 
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 Searle (1969, 1995) offers a view of constitutive rules as well, and his view will be discussed below. 
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Rawls' example is baseball: baseball features a set of rules that define specific offices and 
the actions that are appropriate to them, stations, movements, and penalties for breach of 
rules. He says that the logical priority of the practice rules is this: “given any rule which 
specifies a form of action (a move), a particular action which would be taken as falling 
under this rule given that there is the practice would not be described as that sort of 
action unless there was the practice.”(1958, 25) Contrast this with the summary rule that I 
have to always put a small amount of the salted water in which I have boiled my pasta 
into the sauce which I have prepared to accompany it. I may of course fail to do this and 
remonstrate myself because the finished product is inferior to what I would have 
produced had I followed my rule. But I can boil pasta and make a sauce to accompany it 
even if I fail to follow this rule. But the same is not so with baseball or chess. There is no 
such thing as an 'out' or a 'triple play' if the rules of baseball are not in force. Switching 
the place of my king and rook is not castling unless the practice rules of chess are in 
force. Indeed, the pieces go by those names in an empty sense if the rules of chess are not 
in force. Innumerably many objects can be a token of the type “king in chess”, and 
likewise with the other pieces. 
 These differs from what Rawls calls summary rules. Summary rules are logically 
posterior to the cases to which they apply. My adding salted pasta water to the sauce, or 
inserting garlic cloves between the skin and meat of a chicken I plan to roast, are 
summary rules. Rawls says that the point of having rules at all is that similar cases recur 
and one can get along better by keeping past decisions in mind such that one can more 
efficiently decide in a case that has some precedent. But some cases may exist even if 
there is no rule to apply to it (because it has no precedent). Put generally, Rawls says that 
18 
what  A's and B's refer to in rules of this sort: “Whenever A do B” may be described even 
if this rule does not exist, or if there is no practice in which the rule has a place. 
 In the case of practice rules, however, the actions-types that those rules inaugurate 
are subject to constitutive constraints. If I intend my moving the knight to count as a 
moving of the knight then I must move it in an L-shaped path only. Tamar Schapiro uses 
the example that in order for a judge to punish a defendant she must adhere to the 
“deliberative constraints of our legal system”, which require that punishment can be 
meted just in case a judgment of guilty has been delivered. (2001, 101) A judge who 
delivers a punishment on some other basis, the maximization of expected utility for 
example, is not issuing a punishment at all, but rather doing some other thing. The 
standards or rules of the practice introduce offices and moves that are subject to 
constitutive constraints. 
        This view of rules is naturally suited to a constructivist interpretation.
25
 When asking 
what it is for the rules of chess to be “in force”, the constructivist will respond that this 
means that some set of agents have committed to playing the game or, more strongly, that 
they are authors of the rules of the game. Some will go on to say that this is why these 
rules are a priori regulative of the game, practice, or activity in question. The realist about 
normativity would demur on this point, urging that the rules of the game, practice, or 
activity are independent of any mind or, to put a finer point on it, the volitional activity of 
any agent. Of course one will not likely encounter a realist about the rules of chess. But 
realism about rational standards such as modus ponens is a more plausible, and widely 
held, position. 
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 Not surprisingly, since its first systematic presentation was given by Rawls. 
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            Keeping Rawls in view is helpful for framing Korsgaard's conception of reason as 
a rule or principle-governed activity. Korsgaard is of course not a realist, but an avowed 
anti-realist about rational activity. This can be traced to her deep affinity with Kant, 
whose central point is that reason cannot be construed as a merely responsive 
phenomenon in the way that the realist suggests and still count as free. Rawls' analysis of 
practice rules is homologous to the extent that these rules are conditions on the existence 
of the entities to which they apply. Likewise, for Korsgaard rational principles are 
conditions on the existence of  the fundamental normative entities called substantive 
reasons and rational agents as well. 
      
1.5  Insofar as the general question at hand is “why is rationality normative”, at least a 
few words are necessary regarding the nature of normativity. Theories of normativity take 
many different guises, but they can be given the general characterization of attempting to 
define a set of normative concepts, illustrate how they are related to each other, account 
for how they are deployed in judgments, and situate them in our experience more 
generally. In the course of constructing a theory that encompasses these aspects one will 
have given a metaphysics and epistemology of the normative as well. 
              Theories of normativity can be most easily distinguished by the normative 
concepts they take to be fundamental. Some begin with the concept good, others with 
substantive reason, and analyze other normative concepts in terms of their chosen 
fundamental normative concept or concepts.
26
 Others aim to provide reductive semantic 
                                                 
26
 Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) is an example of a good centered normative theory, Joseph Raz is an 
example of a substantive reason centered theory. 
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analyses, without remainder, of normative language (presumably taking this to be 
sufficient for reduction of normative concepts as well).
27 
                   
The question of the normativity of rationality is complicated for some 
approaches, especially the two of concern below. Korsgaard's and Broome's accounts of 
rational standards belong to their theories of normativity – that is, the explanation of 
normativity invokes rational standards. In the case of Broome, the domain of normativity 
itself can be parsed into ought-facts, reasons, and normative requirements (what 
rationality consists in). Given this, he expresses the question of whether one should 
adhere to normative requirements in terms of whether there is any substantive reason to 
satisfy requirements of rationality individually or collectively. For Korsgaard, as we shall 
see, the application of rational standards ushers normativity into existence, and so telling 
a story about why one ought to adhere to them becomes even more problematic. In both 
cases, normativity as a general domain is understood to include, at least in part, in 
rational standards. But Korsgaard's position is more radical because she says not that 
rational standards are among the things that are normative for us, but rather that what it is 
for anything to be normative is to be explained in terms of rational standard, specifically 
the role they play in deliberation. This has the consequence of making normative 
appraisal of individuals who adhere or stray from rational standards a complicated matter. 
             Of course not just any proposition in which these concepts appear are of concern 
here, but rather those which would be given, as mentioned above, as advice, 
recommendation, remonstration, or alternatively those which can be given expression as 
a question: “why should I satisfy modus ponens”. To answer this question, we will tell a 
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 Stephen Finlay (2009) 
21 
story that says in virtue of what it is true that “one ought to satisfy modus ponens”. 
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2     KORSGAARD'S VIEW 
  
2.1  This section will use the idea of constructivism to frame and situate Korsgaard's 
position, and then use it as a touchstone in characterizing her conception of the activity of 
reason. Next I will discuss Korsgaard's account of constitutive principles and standards, 
explaining how she takes herself to build upon Aristotle's metaphysics of normativity. 
After providing a few doubts about the plausibility of her interpretation and appropriation 
of Aristotle, I will then briefly characterize the conception of rationality and reasoning 
defended by John Broome in order to bring the features of Korsgaard's view into relief. I 
will note some signal ways in which Korsgaard's view is superior to Broome's, and 
finally say a few words about differing approaches to the normativity of rationality 
available to Korsgaard in light of her position. 
 To locate Korsgaard's position in the conceptual terrain it is useful to have a pure 
constructivist account of rational standards in view. This is useful because her position is 
best described as a kind of constructivism (although she seldom claims that moniker for 
herself). A constructivist conception of rational standards would represent these standards 
as the products of some procedure performed by a person or set of persons. They are 
understood to apply to, and be normative for, a person just in case she performed the 
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procedure.
28
  A constructivist about normativity, by contrast, would represent the 
fundamental normative concept/s or entities as the product of some procedure of 
construction, and it would represent facts and truths about what one has reason to do or 
think as issuing from the principles that define this procedure. Constructivists and realists 
about normativity share the conviction that there are normative facts, or normative truths. 
They differ in how to account for these truths: realists urge that there are truths about 
what we have reason to think or do because there are independent normative properties 
that make normative judgments true; constructivists represent the truth of normative 
judgments as a function of commitment to the principles that determine them. In 
Korsgaard's view, these principles are constitutive of deliberative rational activity. 
 Of course, not all constructivists are the same, and the position is not without 
problems. In a case where the standards of rationality are to be understood to obtain and 
apply to someone just in case that person can be represented as having selected them in 
an appropriately structured position (one ideally structured for delivering rational 
standards, say), such as Rawls' original position, it is impossible to subject the behavior 
of the persons selecting rational standards to rational appraisal. And whereas it might be 
acceptable for the behavior of contractors in contractualism or constructivism about 
principles of social distributive justice or morality to not be evaluable in terms of justice 
or morality because they can be evaluated in terms of rationality, it is rather more 
unsettling to be saddled with a view that excludes rational appraisal of someone selecting 
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 This can be given a contractualist construal as well. 
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principles of rationality.
29
 
 Constructivist and contractualist approaches are often subject to a similar line of 
critique, one presented by Hume
30 
and echoed (although differently inflected) by Ronald 
Dworkin.
31
 That is, such approaches either suggest that a procedure of construction or 
contract actually took place which is implausible on empirical grounds, or understand it 
as “metaphorical” or as a “device of representation” in which case it is difficult to say 
why one is bound by it.   
 Constructivists are apt to reconstruct this apparatus so that it is not vulnerable to 
objections of this general sort. Korsgaard does precisely this, I think, by treating the 
exercise of reason in deliberation as the reconstructed procedure of construction. 
Deliberation itself is the so-called procedure of construction. Hers is a constructivism 
about normativity rather than rational standards: substantive reasons, and not rational 
standards, are the product of construction. Rational standards have a crucial role in her 
view, however. They are constitutive principles of the procedure of construction, which 
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 It is of course possible to represent the contractor as adhering to some loosely conceived notion of 
reasonableness or rationality in order to select clearly defined principles of rationality to govern 
thought. It is seems likely, however, that this loosely defined conception of reasonableness or rationality 
will be quite similar to the supposedly different clearly defined principles of rationality understood to 
issue from a procedure of construction once cashed out. Constructivism often runs the risk of smuggling  
the products of construction into the procedure of construction or characterizing those who perform the 
procedure. 
30
 Hume's criticism actually runs deeper than this, and indicts the authority of promise-keeping or fidelity 
itself: in his view, that one has made a promise does not have some special normative authority over 
oneself. The Kantian vindication of the inviolability of promise-keeping depends on a conception of 
human reason and cognition that Hume rejects. See “Of the Original Contract”. Collected in The 
Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought: From Plato to Nietzsche. Broadview Press. 
Buffalo: 2008 
31
 In a review of Rawls' Theory of Justice collected in Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge: 1978 
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she calls the activity of reason. We will see later that Korsgaard's answer to the guiding 
question will be in terms of the relation each person has to this procedure of construction. 
Specifically, Korsgaard reconstructs the procedure of construction as deliberative activity 
of reason itself.  
 
2.2  Korsgaard's understanding of rational standards and substantive reasons belong to 
her account of the nature of reason, and so it is fitting to begin with the necessary 
condition of this activity: reflective awareness. The source of reason, in Korsgaard's view, 
is the “reflective distance” that arises when one becomes aware that one is aware.32 This 
is unquestionably inspired by the notion of “apperception” that constitutes the core of 
Kant's critical turn. Although she does put it quite this way, the reflective distance is best 
construed as a property of awareness. This property accrues to awareness when that 
awareness meets at least a few conditions: it must be apperceptive (for only in being 
aware of itself can it be aware of its attitudes as attitudes, and so as objects in some sense 
independent from itself); it must have a conceptual repertoire sufficiently rich and 
expansive to represent itself, its attitudes, and the authorizing power of endorsement. It is 
natural to give expression to the idea of this property as the awareness one has of the 
deliverances of one's senses as that: one becomes aware of one's seeings as seeings (and 
likewise with the other perceptual media). But most important, one becomes aware of the 
“potential grounds of our beliefs as potential grounds” (2008:18). The phenomenon can 
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 Discussed at length in Korsgaard (1996) 
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be formulated in the following way 
 Reflective distance: the property of awareness that enables it to capture the fact 
 that representations typically cause one to form attitudes or perform actions in  a 
 way that enables one to evaluate these attitudes and actions in light of the 
 representations that typically cause them. 
 
Korsgaard sometimes construes this as the “capacity to distance ourselves from” these 
attitudes and actions and “call them into question.” (1996: 93) 
  Korsgaard highlights the character of this awareness by comparing it to the 
awareness of the non-human animal.
33
 Non-human animals are guided almost entirely by 
their perceptual capacities and instincts. Non-human animal awareness is, in Korsgaard's 
terms, “teleologically organized”. (2008: 19) In order to see what she means by this, 
consider a few examples. For the hound, the squirrel is something to be chased; for the 
squirrel, the acorn is something to be picked up and cracked.
34
 Animals that are 
intellectually more sophisticated may have an awareness that their peers regard certain 
organisms or events as objects of aversion or desire, but even if this is so there is good 
reason (Korsgaard urges) to doubt that these animals have the capacity to step back from 
their teleologically ordered world and ask, to stay with the example, whether the acorn 
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 Korsgaard pursues the same line in (1996). 
34
 It is not clear just what judgments Korsgaard thinks these observations about the way the world is 
disclosed to non-human animals licenses. The natural-historical judgments, or Aristotelian categoricals, 
such as “the squirrel gives birth to two young in early spring”, that Michael Thompson discusses are to 
the point here. Thompson argues that such judgments are logically distinctive, and cannot be captured 
either as universally quantified propositions or as statistical generalizations. Would Korsgaard endorse a  
similar judgment regarding the awareness of non-human animals, such as “The squirrel cracks nuts”? 
But notice that this judgment, insofar as it neglects to mention the character of squirrel awareness and 
focuses only on what the squirrel does,  fails to capture Korsgaard's point. Is “the squirrel encounters 
the nut as something to be cracked” any better? This seems to be a rather fantastic claim. 
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something that should be cracked. Nevertheless, she urges, these animals represent their 
environment to themselves by their perceptions, and these representations cause the 
animals to do what they do. Their environment is represented as having a teleological 
order, she thinks, not just insofar as their perceptions operate on them causally (for surely 
our perceptions also have a place in a causal nexus) but because they lack the special 
form of awareness characteristic of humans. 
 There was probably a time in our own evolutionary history in which our species, 
or some species that was our immediate ancestor, had awareness of this sort. It is an 
awareness in which objects are disclosed as having roles, and that they have these “roles” 
is not a feature of the awareness of the animals who respond differentially to the objects 
or events in question. But at some point along the way we developed the ability to be 
aware that we are seeing, smelling, and tasting. We also became aware that these 
perceptions, to stick with that modality, affect us in characteristic ways. For example, that 
the sky grows dark and the leaves show their underside typically leads one to seek out 
shelter. Korsgaard urges that it is a feature distinctive of human awareness that we are 
conscious of the ways in which our experiences typically activate our instincts, desires, 
and aversions, and that this consciousness is the source of reason. For as a result of it we 
have no option, Korsgaard maintains, but to ask whether the representations that cause 
our beliefs and action “really are grounds” for our attitudes or actions.  
 So much for the idea of reflective distance. It is clear that in Korsgaard's view that  
the reflective distance is very closely tied to the concept of deliberation. Indeed, it will 
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come out below that the activity of reason itself bears such strong resemblance to the 
notion of deliberation that it is sensible to equate the two. Next, it is necessary to 
characterize how substantive reasons are created as a result of deliberative activity. 
 Korsgaard suggests that the concept of a substantive reason and the concept of 
cause are two species of a genus – the species have in common that they are what 
Aristotle called aitiai, or “becauses”.35 Following Kant, Korsgaard calls this genus 
“ground”, and says that it is individuated by the fact that a ground is an answer given in 
response to a “why question.” Earlier she suggests that the perceptual representation of its 
environment had by an animal that causes the animal to behave is an example of a 
ground. Korsgaard is ambiguous regarding whether the representation in question is a 
ground according to us or according to the animal. (2009, 19) Presumably she means the 
former.  
  Most generally, we can say that the genus ground is a form of representation that 
could figure into an answer to a “why question”. When someone asks “why did the 
uprights shudder when struck by the football” one can answer that the football caused 
them to shudder; when someone asks “why did the kicker kick the football toward the 
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 What are the differentiae between the two species of this genus? Korsgaard is less than pellucid on this 
point. It is helpful to consider the relationship between species and genera in general. On the common 
view, a species can be defined in terms of the genus to which it belongs together with a differentia. 
Horse is a species of the genus animal that is a quadruped, mammal, and so on. In like fashion, 
Korsgaard urges that reason “might be defined as a ground that has been endorsed by the person who 
believes or acts.” (2009, 9) This might seem to have as a corollary that the definition of cause is a 
ground that has not been endorsed. But this is too quick: a cause might be a ground that has been 
endorsed and has some other differentiating property. It needn't be the case that a cause is distinguished 
from a reason by lacking the latter's differentiating property.  
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uprights” one can answer that his reason was to score a field goal. This understanding of 
ground has something in common with Raz's suggestion that a reason is “whatever 
provides the answer to questions about the reason why things are as they are, become 
what they become, or to any other reason-why question...”. (2007, 2) Of course Raz does 
not say that reasons are only whatever is given to a why-question – they have to be facts36 
and, as we saw earlier, Raz thinks that all reasons are explanatory since it is probably the 
case that all facts can figure into some explanation (but some are both explanatory and 
normative).  
 The anti-realism of Korsgaard's position is evident: the concepts of cause and 
reason alike are species of a genus of representation deployed by rational entities and do 
not pick out features of a mind-independent reality, such as “facts” in the realist. This 
means that it is not the case that there are reasons, rational standards, or normative 
entities of any kind in the world which, fortunately enough, rational principles enable us 
to identify. It is rather to say that reasons are created in being picked out by rational 
principles that we apply. Normative entities are products of the volitional activity of 
agents and this activity is to be explained in terms of deliberative rational activity (which 
can in turn be parsed into theoretical and practical aspects).
37
  
 A representation counts as a potential ground in virtue of being the object of the 
reflective distance. What was before only a representation that caused one to believe thus 
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 Raz takes facts rather than propositions to be explanatory reasons (since false propositions explain 
nothing) 
37
 See R. Jay Wallace (2010) for a helpful discussion of constructivism about normativity generally. 
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and such is put into question by our awareness, and becomes a potential ground. It 
becomes a 'ground' as a result of this awareness, presumably, because this awareness 
brings with it the possibility that  a 'why-question' of the relevant sort could be given. The 
awareness interrupts the causal relation between the representation and that attitude or 
action to which it leads. If we endorse its operation on us, then it becomes a reason. 
Suppose I see the mouse and, reflecting on the many diseases I believe rodents in general 
to host, I climb onto my couch. Counterfactually, had I lacked the awareness in question 
but nevertheless formed the belief or performed the action called for by the 
representation, then that would have been a cause (and a ground too, given that someone 
could provide that representation as an answer to a why-question) of my behavior rather 
than a reason for it.
38 
But suppose that after coming into the room you ask why I am 
standing on my couch. When I excitedly answer that “there's a mouse!” because I am 
afraid of mice and I see one, then the mouse is the reason why I am on the couch. Here, 
my representation of the mouse is a ground (given the role it plays in answering a why-
question) as well as a reason (since I have endorsed the representation's “operation” on 
me). 
              It is not, of course, that every cause of one's attitude or action is transformed into 
a reason as a result of human awareness. In some cases this is precisely what does not 
occur – instead of seeing the potential grounds of our desires or beliefs as reasons for 
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 Whether we can intelligibly speak of having belief in the relevant sense without apperceptive awareness 
is a matter of debate. In this case we can say that the belief in the absence of this awareness would be a 
representation that portrays the mouse as something to be evaded. 
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them, we will in some cases see them precisely not as reasons (by not endorsing them). If 
we decide that some potential ground is not a reason then one has interrupted the causal 
relation. Representations that would have exercised a merely causal influence are brought 
into the sphere of rational candidacy, to coin an ugly term, by this awareness. They are 
treated as the sort of thing that can figure into rational justification. She writes that “what 
would have been the cause of our belief or action...now becomes something experienced 
as a consideration in favor of a certain belief or action instead, one we can endorse or 
reject” adding that only if we are able to “endorse the operation of a ground of belief or 
action on us as a ground” (2009, 21) do we take the consideration to be a reason. To 
repeat, the consideration that purports to count in favor of belief becomes such by being 
the object of reflective awareness, and it becomes a consideration that does count in favor 
of a belief, a reason, only by our endorsing its operation on us.  
  So although this is a view of reason in the faculty or capacity sense, it is not a 
capacity only. It is a capacity that is continually actualized in the form of an activity, 
namely deliberative activity. The activity of reason can be construed as the procedure of 
construction, and we now have one side of this procedure in view. We see, that is, that 
reasons are the products of the procedure of construction.  When the procedure is 
completely specified we shall have Korsgaard's conception of the normativity of 
rationality in view, and will therefore see her answer to the question why the individual 
standards of rationality are normative - why it is wrong, to stay with the example, to 
violate modus ponens.  
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2.3  The reader will likely have a few questions at this point. On what basis we endorse 
the “operation” of a representation (potential ground) on us? And why does our endorsing 
a potential ground's operation on us make it a reason? What is it to endorse the operation 
of a potential ground?' With reasons not yet on the scene Korsgaard cannot entitle herself 
to the claim that we endorse a representation as a reason on the basis of some reason. 
This is, of course, the same worry mentioned earlier that confronted pure constructivism 
about rational standards: put generally, the constructivist cannot coherently entitle herself 
to the products of the procedure of construction prior to the procedure. This is a difficulty 
because, often anyway, the products of construction are fundamental and very important, 
and it is troubling to be unable to apply them to contractors.  
 The second question also looms. How does one pick out which representations, 
which potential grounds, to endorse? Since reasons are unavailable one has only 
competing potential grounds (representations that typically effect one in a characteristic 
way) available and, moreover, these are are all on the same footing. It is not the case that 
one potential ground has normative authority that another lacks, since concepts of 
normative evaluation are to be constructed. One proposal would be to say that one 
endorses a potential ground in case one finds it pleasurable, or one has desire for it. On 
this view, to “endorse” might simply be to express a pro-attitude about some ground. It 
would also be a wildly untenable conception of theoretical reason to say that reasons are 
the products of the expression of pro-attitudes about representations that activate one in 
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typical ways. This is not Korsgaard's view. She argues that we endorse some potential 
ground as a reason instead of a competing potential ground through the “application” of 
rational principles, and that these are constitutive of the activity of reason. Rational 
standards, then, are the rules that govern the procedure of construction: deliberation. 
 Described functionally, the activity of reason consists in two tasks. Each 
individual with the ability to achieve the form of awareness just mentioned must both 
“construct a new way of conceptualizing the world” and “construct or reconstruct” her 
own nature as a subject of the conception of the world. (2008, 23) An obvious objection 
is to ask which task has priority: if one must construct a new conception of the world then 
there must be some “self” or “subject” in place to do the construction; but Korsgaard 
herself says that the self must also be constituted so that there is a subject for the 
reconceptualized world. If we take Korsgaard literally, then it seems that the project can 
never get started. This initial worry will be addressed later in the form of an objection to  
her view, but it can be set to the side for now.
39  
  The phrase “figure into” still fails to specify how these principles belong to the 
activity opaque. Earlier, Korsgaard says that the principles of rationality describe the 
activity of reason. What is it to say that a principle describes, or is constitutive, of some 
activity? To begin to see her answer consider an image she provides that not only 
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 One of course engages in many doings automatically, without deliberation. Korsgaard might try to 
accommodate this sort of point by construing such automating doings as the continued or habituated 
products of some episode of deliberative rational activity. We will consider later whether this response 
is satisfactory. 
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colorfully represents the deliberative stance: 
 When we become aware that we are representing the world to ourselves, when we 
 turn our attention away from what we perceive and onto the fact that what we 
 are doing is perceiving,then there is a way in which the world loses its unity. 
 What was once simply given to us as the environment is now given to us as a heap 
 of perceptions, or rather experiences, and it is now up to us to put  them back 
 together into a picture of the world.  And in a similar way where once upon a time 
 we always knew what to do in response to  a situation, our own possible 
 responses are now given to us as a heap of desires and fears and impulses, and it 
is  up to us to put ourselves back together. The  principles of rationality are 
 constitutive of the activity of reason, I suggest, because they are principles 
 of unification. (2009, 24) 
  
Rational principles describe the activity reason by being constitutive principles of it, and 
they are constitutive by virtue of their unificatory function. The two primary forerunners 
for Korsgaard's position are Kant and Aristotle. But her discussion of constitutive 
standards and principles also has similarities to Rawls (1958), and it is helpful to keep the 
earlier discussion of Rawls' distinction between practice and summary rules in mind in 
what follows.   
 
2.4  Korsgaard's analysis of constitutive standards owes most to Aristotle, and she looks 
to him to illustrate what it is for a principle to be constitutive. As she says in Self-
Constitution: “According to this account normative principles are in general principles of 
the unification of manifolds, multiplicities, or, in Aristotle's wonderful phrase, mere 
heaps, into objects of particular kinds”. (2009, 50) Korsgaard urges that each kind is 
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specified by a characteristic function, or ergon.
40
 Each object is what it is and not 
something else in virtue of having an ergon peculiar to it. She builds upon Aristotle's 
understanding of the being of sublunary substances, specifically the two ways we in 
which we can inquire into the nature of these substances: either by asking what it is or of 
what it is constituted.
41
 The form of a thing is what it is, its matter is what constitutes it. 
This is often called  his account of hylomorphic compounds. Considered in general, the 
form of something is its unifying principle
42
; the form is the actuality of a thing whereas 
the matter is its potentiality
43
; the form of the thing is what makes that thing intelligible 
as what it is.
44
 
 A clear case is artefactual objects. Consider a trivial example like an ashtray. An 
ashtray can be realized in a many different sort of matter – clay, glass, wood, rubber. The 
material of which it is composed is not essential to it. The form however, is essential. The 
form is the arrangement of the matter that enables it to perform its ergon. An ashtray 
cannot be convex, for example. If it is convex, it won't catch and contain ashes but will 
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 On ergon, see Nichomachean Ethics (1097b 25 – 1098a20).  There, Aristotle asks whether happiness is 
the chief good of man, and thinks that we must have some insight into man's ergon (which W.D. Ross 
translates as “function”) to see if it is. Since the nutritive and sensitive and perceptive life are common 
to other living things, must be “the activity of a soul which follows or implies a rational principle”.  But 
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rather spill them. Nor can an ashtray have a large hole in the middle, and so on.
45
 But it is 
also not the case that the form of the ashtray is able to exist without being embodied in 
some matter. 
 Understanding kinds in terms of their ergon, form, and matter enables one to 
make normative judgments about them, Korsgaard continues. The unstable ashtray is bad 
qua ashtray, and so is the ashtray that has a small hole in the bottom of it.
46 
A good 
ashtray (admittedly not a hard kind to come across) really needs to be only convex, 
stable, and non-combustible. One can express the ergon of the ashtray in terms of a set of 
standards, Korsgaard urges. These standards are special, though, because they are 
constitutive. A standard is constitutive for some kind just in case some entity cannot fail 
to satisfy that standard and still count as an entity of the kind to which the standard 
applies. Put specifically, an ashtray that is concave is not a bad ashtray, but rather it is not 
an ashtray at all – it does not hold ashes. Korsgaard explains that this is true not only of 
object-kinds but also of activity kinds.  
 Activity kinds are individuated by what Korsgaard calls constitutive principles 
rather than constitutive standards.  A constitutive principle of an activity, just as with 
constitutive standards, is a principle such that if one fails to uphold it then one does not 
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 Thomson (2008) makes a similar point in distinguishing goodness-fixing from non goodness-fixing 
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good K is being good qua K”. 
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 This has the appearance of a vagueness problem – if one increases the diameter of the hole 
incrementally, at what point does it cease to be an ashtray? I will avoid this matter entirely. 
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count as engaging in the activity in question. To stay with the example, the person 
engaged in the process of making an ashtray is guided by the constitutive principles of 
that process. Of course, these principles must have some connection with the constitutive 
standards of the kind under manufacture: the process of making an ashtray is governed by 
the principle that one is making something that holds ashes. This, though, is an example 
of a process and not an activity. There is reason to think that activities and processes are 
different, and Korsgaard aims to draw on Aristotle's distinction between energeia and 
kinesis to explain the nature of the activity of reason. 
 On Aristotle's analysis, activity (energeia), on its strictest construal, is the 
opposite of production (poesis).
47
Production is a sort of doing that has an end beyond 
itself and that ceases once this end is achieved. Activity is a sort of doing that has no end 
beyond itself. Korsgaard clearly thinks that activity of reason is an instance of this 
general phenomenon. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that activity is the fulfillment of 
the ergon of a functionally organized kind: “For the work [ergon] is a completion, and the 
actuality is the work, hence even the name, 'en-ergeia' is said with respect to the ergon, 
and aims at the completedness.” (1050a21-2) Korsgaard self-consciously fashions her 
approach after Aristotle's at least to the extent that the latter took the completed or 
actualized individuating function of a kind to be an activity with the characteristics just 
mentioned. Likewise, the activity of reason, in her view, is the actualization of the feature 
that distinguishes the kind human from other kinds. 
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 Her account of reason as an activity does not, however, meet all the conditions 
that Aristotle sets on that phenomenon. In Aristotle's view an activity has the 
distinguishing features of not exhibiting change, being complete in each of its moments, 
and lacking of an external end that extinguishes the activity once it is reached. As 
examples, notice the difference between building a structure such as a house, a perfect 
example of poesis and seeing, an example of energeia. The analogy is not perfect, 
though. The activity of reason does not seem to be complete in each of its moments in the 
same way as seeing. No episode of healthy seeing is more complete qua seeing than any 
other moment, whereas having endorsed some potential ground as a reason does seem to 
be both the completion of rational activity. Also, Korsgaard repeatedly speaks in terms of 
the  payoff of the activity of reason as its enabling us to successfully navigate the world. 
(2009, 28) This way of putting it seems very close to suggesting that the activity indeed 
does have a goal external to it. The point should not be belabored though. Korsgaard's use 
of “activity” is probably designed to capture the fact that the activity of reason cannot be 
carried out just once, but must be repeatedly undertaken throughout the life of the 
individual capable of reflective awareness. 
 It is helpful to mention another similarity. Consider Rawls' analysis of practice 
rules: if after rounding first base the batter cuts a hard left and heads straight for the 
short-stop she is not making a move in baseball. It is a constitutive principle of baseball 
that one runs to second after first, and third after second (there is a reason why the bases 
are individuated by cardinal numbers – there is a uniquely correct order in which they 
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must be reached). More to the point, practice rules inaugurate the entities to which they 
apply. Something similar can be said with respect to Korsgaard's view of principles of 
rationality. The rational agent is simply the product of the activity of reason, which itself 
is conditioned by the principles of rationality. The rational agent, then, comes to exist 
through the application of these principles. The agent is both guided and constituted by 
the rules of the activity. 
 But given her constructivism, it is not quite right to say that one is guided. Rather, 
Korsgaard urges that we should say that the person guides herself by means of these 
principles in performing the activity, and that by guiding herself it follows that she is 
guided.
48
 Although constitutive principles set standards of correctness qua the kind for 
which they are principles, it is up to the agent/subject to adhere to them, because it is up 
to the agent to participate in the activity for which they are constitutive. I have the 
capacity, that is, to determine to run in a bee-line from first base to short-stop. But to do 
so would be to flout the activity in which I have chosen to engage. Whether this line of 
thought is acceptable with respect to the activity of reason, though, is not obvious. The 
suggestion that one must have the capacity to not engage in the activity in question is 
suspicious: although this is surely plausible regarding activities such as games or 
episodes of reasoning (or even Aristotelian activities such as contemplation), it appears to 
be a much less happy fit given Korsgaard's encompassing conception of reason as 
activity.  
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 The reader will perhaps have guessed by now how this view is supposed to have 
application to the activity of reason. Rational activity is the completion of the ergon of 
the rational creature. We are what we are in virtue of having this ability, and we are fully 
what we are in actualizing it. However, it may be asked how this analogy with the 
artefactual is supposed to hold in the absence of something that is made by the activity. 
Korsgaard has an answer here: rational activity produces further rational activity. Just as 
Aristotle distinguishes the form of the living from the form of the non-living by saying 
that the life form self-modifies or reproduces itself (the dog reproduces itself not only 
through mating, but also in engaging in nutritive activities, sleeping, eating, and so on: it 
makes itself into its own form), the rational agent reproduces itself as a rational agent.
49   
  It is necessary to mention a crucial disanalogy here, one that will be come a 
problem for Korsgaard later. In Aristotle's view the ergon of a thing does individuate it, 
and can be expressed by a principle (it is what is discovered through assiduous empirical 
research), and does support normative judgments. But supporting normative judgments is 
a fairly weak grounding (much weaker than constitution). It is not true for Aristotle that, 
for any kind whatsoever, the ergon of that kind determines whether something is 
flourishing, or doing well or badly qua kind. In the case of humans our ergon as rational 
creatures (creatures that have it in us to be rational) must be developed through proper 
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 There is precedent for this way of speaking about the continuation of an organic entity through time. In 
the third Critique, Kant understands organic entities both as causes and effects of their form, but urges 
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understand them purely in terms of mechanistic explanation. We are not in a position to know the nature 
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sensory intuition simply given and structured by the pure forms of intuition and the categories).  
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habituation if we are to count as thinking well or rationally, and as a corollary, our ergon 
must have been properly developed for it to make sense to say of one that she should 
think rationally (since here as elsewhere ought implies can).  
 The question for Korsgaard, then, becomes how the kind human being relates to 
the kind rational activity. It should have become clear by now that rational activity for 
Korsgaard is not the ergon for humans in the same way that rationality is the ergon of 
humans for Aristotle. For there is a sense in which a person would no longer fully be 
human if he no longer engaged in rational activity, and so the failure to satisfy the 
constitutive principles of that activity (standards of rationality) actually puts pressure on 
one's properly belonging to the kind in question. There is overwhelming evidence that 
this was not Aristotle's view of the relationship between rationality and humanity. 
 An additional clarificatory point needs to be made. There is an understandable 
tendency to see Korsgaard's picture of rational activity as analogous to Kant's conception 
of cognition. In both cases the individual is bombarded with material that is not fully 
conceptualized (with potential grounds playing the role analogous to the manifold of 
intuition) and that must be structured by the active dimension of the cognizer in order to 
amount to intentional experience. And like Kant's view of cognition, apperception 
occupies a necessary and absolutely central role in this activity. 
 But the analogy is not an apt one. This is because Korsgaard places emphasis on 
our ability to “stand back” and consider a ground as a potential ground and determine 
whether to endorse the way it typically affects us. There is no free space analogous to this 
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on Kant's conception of cognition, nor on any plausible interpretation of it anyway.
50
 
Although the “I think” must be able to accompany any of my representations if it is to 
count as my representation, it is not the case that the synthetic unity of apperception 
consciously applies the categories to the manifold of intuition.  
 Later I will attempt to give content to Korsgaard's picture of reason and rationality 
by illustrating its structure in greater detail, developing her view as charitably as possible. 
In doing so it will become clear that her account is unsatisfactory.  
 
2.5  Before criticizing Korsgaard's picture, it is helpful to consider the view of rationality 
and reasoning endorsed by John Broome to bring the salient features of her view into 
relief. As briefly discussed above, Broome urges that the domain of normativity can be 
parsed into not only the concept of substantive reasons and oughts but normative 
requirements as well.
51
 Normative requirements are a wide-scope relation between 
attitudes, which means that they are structural requirements that govern combinations of 
propositions, specifying which combinations one should have and not which 
propositional attitudes one ought to have taken in isolation. Broome argues that 
rationality consists in the set of normative requirements. As an example, consider the case 
of the person who believes that hard back books have sharp teeth (p). If modus ponens is 
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a standard of rationality then this person ought to believe that she should wear sturdy 
metal gloves when opening hard back books (q) because she believes that hardback 
books have sharp teeth and a surly temperament, and one should wear sturdy protective 
gloves when handing anything that has sharp teeth and a surly temperament (p → q) . If 
modus ponens is to count as a rational standard, then this particular way of formulating it 
has unattractive consequences: namely, it requires us to form beliefs that we have no 
reason to form. The problem is that this approach treats the the requirement as having an 
“ought” that can be detached. This means that, taking the intuitive rational standard that 
one should believe what follows from one's beliefs, the “ought” can be transferred from 
the implication itself to the content of the belief (the proposition) that is implied. Just 
because q follows from p it doesn't follow that I ought or should have q.
52
 
 As an alternative, Broome urges that rational requirements have a wide scope, 
which means that they govern which combinations of attitudes, telling one what 
combinations of attitudes one should have but not which attitudes taken in isolation one 
should have. The ought of normative requirements, that is, is non-detaching. For modus 
ponens, as an example, it is a rational requirement that one not be in the state of having 
the attitudes (p, p → q, ~ q) or that one should, if it matters to one, be in the state of (p, p 
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 Another way to illustrate the problem with treating rational requirements as giving  detaching oughts is 
to note that every proposition implies itself (p → p). Consider the normative rational requirement which 
requires you to believe what is implied by your belief. Since every proposition implies itself, if I believe   
p and I am required to believe what follows from p, then it follows that I ought to believe p. So if we 
treat the requirements in question as giving detaching oughts, then it makes belief self-justifying. 
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→ q, q).53 This says that one ought to see to it that one is in the state of satisfying this 
requirement, or of not violating this requirement. As another example, consider the 
commonly held view of rationality that one should believe what is entailed by one of 
one's existing beliefs. If we treat the requirement between p → q as detaching, then one 
ought to believe that one is over 6 feet tall if one believes that one is 6' 3”, even if one is 
only 5'8”. But surely it is not the case that one ought to believe that one is over 6 feet tall 
just because one has the mistaken belief that one is 6' 3”. 
 Broome stipulates an operator to stand for the normative requirement, “O”, that 
operates on a combination of attitudes: O [~(p, p → q,~q)]. Conceiving of rationality in 
this way enables Broome to answer to the intuition that the core of that phenomenon has 
to do with the interrelations between our attitudes (the intuition that informs the idea that 
the paradigmatic example of irrationality is in which a person adopts some attitude or 
performs some action that she judges herself to have no reason to have or perform), but 
also avoid the unpalatable consequences of the other view this just mentioned. Broome 
characterizes his conception of rationality as requiring that “particular relations to hold 
among your beliefs, quite independently of any inferential relations that may hold among 
your beliefs contents.” (2010, 7) Like many others, he counts modus ponens and no 
contradictory beliefs among the set of rational requirements. Broome's view of 
rationality, the reader will likely have noticed, has a significant structural dimension. 
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Rationality is exhausted by avoiding certain combinations of attitudes – so long as one 
does not instantiate a non-sanctioned pattern, one counts as rational. 
 For Broome's conception of rationality as a set of wide-scope normative 
requirements to be of the most use in shedding light on Korsgaard's view, it helps to 
consider it alongside his view of reasoning. In his view, reasoning is a specific sort of 
succession of mental states called attitudes (which are relations between a person and 
content) in some mind.
54 
Although we typically do not hesitate to count the inscription of 
propositions standing in inferential relations in proof-construction or in legal and 
philosophical argumentation as instances of reasoning, Broome thinks of these as 
derivative from, and parasitic on, what I will call his essentially psychologistic 
conception. The specific character of this succession distinguishes it from other mental 
activities. Namely, in reasoning one has a succession of attitudes, called premise 
attitudes, that cause one to adopt a previously unheld attitude or confirm an attitude in 
which one was previously unconfirmed, called a conclusion attitude. As mentioned 
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 A content is a proposition and a mark. Many have urged that the content of attitudes are propositions 
only, and so the belief that 'I am in Oxford, MS' and the desire 'I want to be in Oxford, MS' have the 
same content 'RCE is in Oxford, MS'. Broome thinks this is not quite right, since to say 'RCE is in 
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they were sundered one could not reason with desires (one had only the propositional content to deal 
with and not the desire). But it isn't clear how adding some subjective pro-attitude makes the desire rife 
for reasoning.  
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earlier, the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning for Broome is based 
upon the nature of the conclusion attitude. If the conclusion attitude is an intention, then 
it is an instance practical reasoning; if the conclusion attitude is a belief, then it is an 
instance of theoretical reasoning. He defends a first-order model of reasoning which 
looks like the following. First, consider this example: 
 The leaves are showing their undersides. 
 If the leaves are showing there undersides, then it is about to rain. 
 So it is about to rain. 
On the picture of theoretical reasoning that Broome advocates, one initially believes the 
first two propositions but not the third. One comes to believe the third by saying the first 
two propositions to oneself, and then saying the third. In saying the third, one comes to 
believe it. Reasoning is a computational process that operates on the contents of one's 
attitudes directly, and one does this by saying one's attitudes to oneself. In so doing one 
causes oneself do adopt new attitudes.  
 Crucially, one does not say propositions to oneself about one's attitudes, but one 
merely says the propositions themselves. Were one to reason about one's attitudes then 
one would fall into a regress, in Broome's view. For reasoning about my attitudes entails 
that I form normative beliefs about them, for example that I ought to believe q because it 
follows from p and I believe p. The problem here is that the only way to acquire this 
belief about my other beliefs is through reasoning. But by the second-order model I can 
reason only by forming normative beliefs about my attitudes, so I will have to have third 
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order belief about my reasoning which leads to the second order belief (which in turn is 
about my first order reasoning). But the third-order belief will itself have to be reached 
through reasoning and will require a fourth-order, and a fifth-order, and so on. This, the 
second order model, generates a regress in his view. 
 There are problems with Broome's first-order view as well: first, it is not clear 
why reasoning should have to conclude in the acquisition of a previously unheld or 
unconfirmed attitude – in constructing a proof of the law of non-contradiction, 
recalculating the probability of the joint occurrence of two events, or running through 
Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of space, I do not acquire a new attitude 
nor become confirmed in an attitude in which I was previously unconfirmed. Yet surely 
these episodes should count as reasoning. Second, given that the primary nature of 
reasoning is a causal relation between attitudes that is supposed to track the inferential 
relations between the contents of these attitudes he must provide some account of how 
the inferential relations between the contents of attitudes relate to the causal relations 
between the attitudes themselves. For as stated, there is a substantial disconnect between 
the two. 
 For Broome, then, reasoning is discrete and bounded process that occurs prior to 
the adoption of belief or formation of intention.
55
 By contrast, Korsgaard's conception of 
reason is an activity that is not hemmed in by the formation of some attitude – although 
she typically describes the activity of reason in terms of its deliberative character, it 
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would be mistaken to think of Korsgaardian rational activity as identifiable with explicit 
episodes of reasoning as that phenomenon is construed by Broome. Rather, although seen 
most clearly in cases of theoretical and practical deliberation, the activity of reason can 
perhaps be embodied in non-discursive deliberation as well (unlike Broome's first-order 
account of reasoning). Examples are easy to furnish, such as deciding whether to take 
one's umbrella by simply looking to the umbrella, then to the sky, then back to the 
umbrella, and grabbing it. This is plausibly described as an episode of deliberation, and 
perhaps even reasoning, but it is unaccompanied by the “saying” of premises to oneself. 
 
2.6  My primary objection to Broome's view shows what is preferable about Korsgaard's 
approach at the most general level, even if I will later criticize her account on not only its 
details but trajectory more generally. That is, Broome's conception of rationality has at 
best a tenuous relation to the activity of reasoning. This is because in order to avoid the 
problems that beset a conception of rational requirements as issuing detaching oughts he 
suggests that the standards of rationality require relations to hold among one's beliefs 
independent of the inferential relations that obtain between the belief's contents and that 
these structural requirements apply only to states and not to processes. At best, we can 
“be brought to satisfy” the requirements of rationality during reasoning, but it is obvious 
that they are merely orthogonal to one another. Reasoning is a temporally extended 
process, and in determining what to believe I successively say my premise attitudes to 
myself and only after this form a conclusion attitude that is caused by my reasoning with 
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my premise attitudes. So at t I say a premise attitude to myself and at t + 1 I say a 
different premise attitude to myself and at t + 2 I form the conclusion attitude. The 
requirements of rationality come in sideways-on relative to this process, and I satisfy 
them only by instantiating the right combination (modus ponens, no contradictory beliefs, 
etc.) of attitudes at some point or instant in the course of carrying out the reasoning 
process.  
 Broome will perhaps respond by saying that although the requirements of 
rationality apply to different levels they are connected at least insofar as one cannot 
reason correctly and fail to satisfy them. On the one hand this is suspect because there is 
good reason to think that at least some rational requirements are narrow-scope and apply 
to processes rather than states.
56
 But it in addition, it isn't even clear what it is to reason 
correctly in Broome's view. One prima facie promising suggestion is to say that reasoning 
correctly just is adhering to patterns of valid inference, deductive and inductive. But this 
cannot be right – for example, using valid patterns of inference one can show that one is 
equal to three. (Harman, 1999) Although some rules of logic are intuitive candidates for 
rational standards,  as noted earlier, the theory of implication should be distinguished 
from at least the standards of rationality, and for similar reasons from reasoning 
understood generally. 
   Broome might suggest that reasoning correctly is a process that fits the 
description given above and satisfies at least some normative requirements during the 
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process (or rater, does not violate any normative requirement of rationality). But it is 
implausible to argue that the only condition on reasoning correctly is that one satisfy 
some wide-scope normative requirement during the episode. Since on Broome's account 
normative requirements do not apply to the inferential relations that obtain between 
contents of attitudes, he is ill-equipped to distinguish between satisfying normative 
requirements that have to do with a specific episode of reasoning (and so satisfying a 
normative requirement because of that piece of reasoning) and satisfying a normative 
requirement that has a purely accidental relation to the episode of reasoning in question.  
 Additionally, Broome appears to inherit a difficulty from realist conceptions of 
normativity. He comes up empty handed when asked why one should satisfy normative 
requirements. Given the details of his theory he phrases this in terms of whether 
rationality, understood either as a set of requirements or individual requirements, gives us 
substantive reasons. And as yet he has been unable to provide an affirmative answer to 
this question.
57
 
 Korsgaard, by contrast, treats the standards of rationality as constitutive standards 
of the activity reason, and construes the activity of reason as coeval with the distinctively 
human awareness. Before presenting criticisms of her view, it should be noted that 
Korsgaard's approach makes a signal improvement over Broome's. Namely, she urges 
that the standards of rationality have an internal relation to the activity of reason. This is a 
virtue of her account because any approach that gives independent analysis to rationality 
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and reasoning risks making any relationship between the two occult. Put differently, 
treating rationality and reasoning as independently explicable courts dualism properly so-
called (as a result, we will be unable to see how the two come together). But surely there 
is some connection between the two – the nearly universal acceptance of certain central 
rules of inference as candidate rational standards illustrates how strong this intuition is.
58
 
 Recall the quote from Korsgaard which opened this paper: there is no difficulty in 
saying that one ought to believe q if it follows from one's belief that p. That we ought to 
believe it is a “reminder” of the constitutive standards of an activity to which we are 
committed, and is a reminder of our commitment to that activity. One is liable to object 
by saying that it is implausible to say that we ought to have a belief that there is no reason 
to believe. But on Korsgaard's view there is indeed reason to have this belief, and the 
reason is generated by the application of a rational standard (what she calls rational 
principle) that relates the two propositions. In forming the belief q one applies a rational 
principle that is constitutive of reason. 
 Before progressing, it is necessary to note a potential problem for Korsgaard. The 
application of a rational principle might be understood to be consciously undertaken, 
such that the principle is held in mind when we determine what to believe or do. This is 
not a tenable view. Were it Korsgaard's, then she will have made herself vulnerable to an 
obvious regress: if rational principles are the objects of consciousness then it will be 
necessary to know what they mean, to interpret them. But we can do that only on the 
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basis of some other principle or rule, which we use to interpret that principle, which itself 
requires yet another rule, and so on.
59
 So although Korsgaard speaks of “applying” 
rational principles, her use of “application” is not properly understood in a traditional 
sense of that term. The most promising way to give content to the idea of “applying a 
rational principle” on Korsgaard's theory is, for example, simply forming the belief q 
when q follows from p. 
 A final point. Korsgaard's conception of rationality is much more of a process-
forward account than Broome's. To be rational, on her view, is to adhere to principles that 
govern the formation of beliefs by determining which potential grounds are reasons. It is 
perhaps a bit ironic that I should say of Korsgaard's account of rationality (as part of an 
activity) that it fits a process account best. But, as urged earlier, it is far from obvious that 
Korsgaard's understanding of activity should be understood to conform to Aristotle's strict 
account. The point, rather, is that rational standards are diachronic, governing something 
that we do. 
 
2.7  If one were to guess Korsgaard's answer to the guiding question (“why should I be 
rational?”) in light of the discussion of her view up to this point only, the following 
would be a fine suggestion: you should be rational because the principles of rationality 
are constitutive features of an activity that is essential to our kind. Such an approach 
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might fall within what is sometimes called Aristotelian natural normativity, an approach 
revitalized by Anscombe (1957) and developed by Foot (2001) and Thompson (2008). 
This sort of view would treat the normative as entering in as the relation between the 
general and the particular, specifically, between the flourishing or proper function of an 
instance of some kind qua that kind. Consider the judgment “The female groundhog has 
two young in the spring”. Thompson calls this a natural-historical judgment, and notes 
that it has some rather surprising characteristics. First, it is not, despite appearances, a 
universally quantified judgment. Something does not stop being a female groundhog 
should it not give birth to two young in the Spring. But neither is this a probable 
statistical generalization – it is not likely that a female groundhog, as a matter of fact, will 
give birth in a Spring (much less in every Spring).
60
 The truth of the natural historical 
judgment, or what he also calls an Aristotelian Categorical, is not a function of whether 
all or even most groundhogs actually do reproduce in the Spring. Judgments of this sort, 
Thompson urges, are not distributive and exhibit what he calls “non-Fregean generality”. 
This sort of  judgment allows for exceptions, but not of a ceteris paribus sort that restrict 
its generality. Hence, we can say of the groundhog that does not reproduce that there is 
something wrong with it. We can make normative judgments on the basis of the special 
relation between the general and the particular. This is similar to the point made earlier 
when Korsgaard urged that understanding objects in terms of their matter and form 
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supports normative judgments about them. A different way of characterizing this 
approach can be seen in Hurka (1993) whose ethical  perfectionism urges that rationality, 
understood as the capacity to acquire knowledge with the properties of extent (scope) and 
dominance (number of beliefs subordinate to it), is the essential characteristic of human 
kind to which we belong. Since we are better qua human to the extent that we more 
perfectly instantiate this capacity, we should satisfy rational standard (such as modus 
ponens) that are a part of this capacity. An application of this line of argument to 
Korsgaard's approach would say that “The human being adheres to modus ponens in its 
thinking”. To the extent that instances of the human form do not adhere to this we can say 
that there is something wrong with this person and that he should adhere to modus 
ponens.
61
  
  But Korsgaard's view is not so clear. She also suggests that the constitutive 
principles of an activity are normative for the participant of that activity if and only if that 
participant has committed to the activity. She frames the categorical in terms of reflective 
distance. But in this case, as suggested earlier, the normativity will issue from the 
endorsement or commitment rather than the relation between the general and the 
particular expressible in the claim that the “the human engages in the activity of reason”. 
On this approach it is not belonging to the kind that makes them normative, but rather the 
commitment. Which view best expresses Korsgaard's position regarding the normativity 
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of rational standards will be considered below.  
 With Korsgaard's account fully in view, it is now necessary to draw attention to its 
inadequacies. The objections below criticize Korsgaard along two axes: first there are 
objections to Korsgaard's conception of reason and the rational principles that are 
supposedly constitutive of it (and so her conception of rational standards); second, I will 
object to Korsgaard's view of the normativity of rational principles. 
 Although I organize the criticisms along these two axes, given how tightly 
Korsgaard weds her explanation of the concepts of reason and rationality they will 
occasionally sound similar. Additionally, although Korsgaard's general picture is in view 
crucial details are not. I have delayed close treatment of Korsgaard's account of the 
application of rational principles to potential grounds because only in attempting to give 
substance to Korsgaard's schematic account will we see the objections to which it is 
vulnerable, and recognize that her approach is not even intelligible, much less 
satisfactory. 
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3  OBJECTIONS TO KORSGAARD'S VIEW 
 
3.1  The first objection to Korsgaard's view can be called the objection from incoherence. 
The description of Korsgaard's constructivism above will perhaps have made the reader 
aware of it: if substantive reasons are created in being picked out by rational principles, 
then there must be something to be picked out. It seems incoherent to suggest that 
something can be picked out if it is created only in being picked out? This is akin to  
objection sometimes presented against the idea of extensional definition of a concept or 
class: on what basis can one group like instances so that the that class or concept can be 
defined as the set of those entities? Without a rule (specifically the concept to be defined 
extensionally) in view one's selection will be random or rely on some inscrutable power 
of intuition. 
           The germ of this objection also appears once the idea of reflective distance 
receives scrutiny. That concept turns on the notion that I can ask of some representation 
whether I should endorse its operation on me. This looks incoherent insofar as asking 
whether I should endorse the operation of some representation on me is intelligible in 
terms of substantive reasons. As discussed earlier, the core of this sort of objection is the 
claim that Korsgaard helps herself to concepts in describing the procedure of construction 
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to which she is not entitled because they are the products of that procedure. Substantive 
reasons supposedly come into existence only once I endorse its operation on me – but 
what could it even mean to ask whether I “should” endorse some representations 
operation on me without the idea of substantive reason in view? Although I call it the 
objection from incoherence for this reason, I think in the process of developing 
Korsgaard's position in response to it illustrates her vulnerability to a somewhat different, 
but just as serious, problem. 
            One way to respond on Korsgaard's behalf is to say that normative terms such as 
“should” and “ought” are not to be analyzed in terms of substantive reasons. This, 
however, will not work given that Korsgaard herself urges that the domain of normativity 
comes into existence as a result of the volitional activity of agents, to use R. Jay Wallace's 
phrase (2006). So, strictly speaking, there is no space for even normative terms like 
“should” or “ought” prior to the creation of reasons. If this is Korsgaard's position, then it 
surely is incoherent. Perhaps, though, her view can be developed in a manner that renders 
this incoherence merely apparent.  
 Let us return to Korsgaard's description of rational activity. Principles of 
rationality, she says, are applied in determining what to believe, (2008, 18) and through 
the application of rational principles representations that were formerly only causes of 
our behavior are instead encountered as reasons for it. Or better, what was once a cause 
becomes a rational candidate or potential ground through our special form of awareness – 
it becomes the sort of thing that can be seen as a reason to have an attitude or perform an 
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action, a reason not to have some attitude or perform an action, or something that is in 
fact not a reason at all. Only once a cause (or some set of causes) becomes a rational 
candidate or potential ground as result of the distinctively human awareness can it 
become a reason in being picked out by a rational principle. But how does the application 
of a rational standard such as modus ponens pick out a reason from a set of potential 
grounds? The natural suggestion is to say that the conclusion drawn from a substitution 
instance of modus ponens just is the reason that is picked out.  
 This suggestion, though, requires that premises are available for such an inference 
to take place.  That is: one encounters a set of potential grounds for one's beliefs and one 
has to determine whether these potential grounds are reasons, that they stand in rational 
relations to the beliefs that one is disposed to form.
 
If modus ponens is a principle that 
one uses to determine whether some potential ground is a reason, then how does one 
come to have premises from which one can draw the conclusion (and so the reason)? 
Only from true premises together with a valid (or strong) pattern of inference can one be 
guaranteed (or make it likely) that one draws a true conclusion. Adhering to modus 
ponens in deliberating does not transform a potential ground into a reason because it is 
simply a pattern that preserves truth. We cannot give ourselves reasons to believe 
something just because it is the conclusion derived in a substitution instance of modus 
ponens – for the premises could be false. Something does not become a reason just 
because it has been “picked out” by modus ponens on the most plausible construal of 
“picking out”. 
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 To say that the premises are themselves a product of such an application of modus 
ponens only kicks the can down the road, and the buck (as it were) has to stop somewhere 
to avoid a regress. So this way of picking out a reason from a set of potential grounds, or 
alternatively endorsing a potential ground as a reason, is prima facie inadequate – the 
application of rational principles such that it enables us to pick out a reason from a set of 
potential grounds is not correctly construed in this way. 
 This argument can be pressed at a different level as well. Consider the question: 
“on what basis does one apply a rational principle?”. On a metaphysical interpretation, 
the very idea of one applying a rational principle implies that something exists (in some 
sense or other) that applies it, namely a rational agent. But Korsgaard maintains that the 
rational agent who applies principles is constituted through the application of principles – 
so it seems that the entity that applies the principle must exist in order to apply it. 
 On a logical interpretation of this question, we ask for what reason one applies a 
rational principle. This seems to come up empty handed also: for reasons are the product 
of the application of rational principle and are therefore not available independent of 
them. This is reminiscent of the problem Socrates presents to Euthyphro when the latter 
suggests that for something to be pious just is for it to be loved by the gods.
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 If reasons 
are the result of the application of rational principles, then the application of rational 
principles has to be arbitrary. This is sometimes called the boot-strapping objection to 
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constructivism – it seems very counterintuitive to say that reasons can simply be ushered 
into existence by the endorsement of an individual. Although Korsgaard aims to give 
content to endorsement by construing it as the application of a rational principle, it is 
questionable whether this answers the objection. 
 Korsgaard might try to counter the arbitrariness objection in its logical guise by 
urging that there is only one set of rational principles to be applied since the source and 
nature of the activity of reason is the same for every creature that has reason. The 
reflective awareness that she treats as the source of the activity of reason (and therefore 
of the application of rational principles) has one and the same structure across the set of 
all creatures that have it. In this way, she might urge, the application of rational principles 
is clearly not arbitrary because for something to be arbitrary implies that there are options 
other than that thing and any option is as good as any other option. But this is precisely 
not the case with the application of rational principles – they are our only option. So the 
application of rational principles is not arbitrary. 
 If this blocks the objection of arbitrariness, it does so only by invoking a 
consideration of the wrong kind: this response to arbitrariness is at bottom an invocation 
of brute fact. It simply says that “we are creatures that y and all such creatures y” - but 
surely this is the wrong kind of reason with which to counter the arbitrariness charge. A 
fitting answer to the charge will be to show that on rational grounds the application of 
rational principles is not arbitrary. But to say simply that, as a matter of fact, we all have 
the same cognitive equipment or we are all necessitated to form beliefs that enable us to 
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navigate the world successfully does not help here. For we might have been constituted 
differently, such that our awareness engendered different rational principles. If this is 
Korsgaard's response to the objection of arbitrariness then it makes the standards of 
reason contingent on brute fact.
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 One might come to Korsgaard's aid here by urging that I have simply begged the 
question against her. To complain that her view is vulnerable to a charge of arbitrariness 
because she cannot provide a basis, specifically a reason, for the application of rational 
principles is simply to assume a non-constructivist view of reasons and then blame 
Korsgaard for not satisfying the conditions on such a view. But the nature of reasons, and 
whether they obtain independent of our rational activity, the objection will continue, is 
precisely what is in question.  
 There is perhaps something to this response, but it has been addressed above. 
Namely, Korsgaard's interlocutor and Korsgaard alike have the intuition that there has to 
be some basis for the application of rational principles, and this intuition typically finds 
expression in normative concepts like “substantive reason”. But her interlocutor need not 
say that the bare intuition that substantive reasons are the way stay the specter of 
arbitrariness is sufficient to scuttle Korsgaard's theory, or that they are the only way to 
show the inadequacy of her approach. Rather, he can simply show that Korsgaard is 
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unable to provide any satisfactory basis, substantive reason or otherwise, to answer the 
charge of arbitrariness. I suggested just this above, urging that she relies on a basis of the 
wrong kind (that is, brute fact) to avoid the arbitrariness of the application of rational 
principles. I did not, of course, endeavor to show that it is impossible for Korsgaard to 
furnish a satisfactory basis for the application of rational principles in a constructivist 
vein: but her options have been narrowed. 
 Not only is the brute-fact response to the arbitrariness charge unpalatable, it is 
especially so given Korsgaard's position. Korsgaard aims to vindicate the rational 
authority and autonomy of humanity, and show that it is of singular importance: 
specifically it is the source, and the only source, of normativity. But if we might have 
been differently equipped than we in fact are, then this source is merely a contingent fact 
of our constitution. 
 Korsgaard attempts to settle the metaphysical aspect of the objection from 
incoherence by an argument from analogy. Just as an organic entity maintains itself by 
ingesting nutritive material in the way that members of its species typically do (the 
anteater uses its long proboscis to reach its fare, acquiring the materials its body needs to 
persist through time and so making itself into itself, ultimately reproducing its form in 
offspring) the rational agent persists by performing its characteristic activity: put crudely, 
achieving awareness with the property of reflective distance, applying rational principles, 
determining what to believe, acting on the basis of these beliefs, and presumably doing it 
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all over again.
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 But the strength of this analogy is questionable. The core of the analogy is that the 
way that constitutive principles describe the persistence of organic systems is the same 
way as the activity of reason is constituted by rational principles. It is somewhat clear 
how this hylomorphic view sheds light on the perpetuation of the organism qua organism, 
both the individual through nutritive intake and also the species through reproduction, but 
is rather less helpful for understanding the nature of reason's activity.
65
 The most obvious 
wedge to drive between the two is to stress, perhaps flat-footedly, that organic 
hylmorphism is just that: organic. It is embodied. It is not clear that one's awareness and 
seeing something as a reason at moment is related to one's seeing something as a reason 
at a later time in the same way that one's organic existence at a later time is related to 
one's organic existence at an earlier time. At the risk of sounding obtuse, this seems 
radically different from, say standards of rationality. They surely are not dependent on 
matter in the same way as the principles that describe the perpetuation of some organic 
system.  
  Again, one risks begging the question against Korsgaard in responding this way, 
urging that a consequence of her view is that we cannot very well help ourselves to 
realism about rational standards, and since realism about rational standards is correct, we 
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organic system is itself plausible, which requires an investigation of how it relates to the most 
developed biological understanding of organic systems. 
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should not adopt her view. But to accept this position requires Korsgaard to bite a bullet, 
the same one mentioned above. That is, why are these the rational principles – could we 
not have been constituted such that the application of some other principle (say some 
invalid rule of inference) enables us to see considerations as reasons? To respond 
negatively to this question, at the very least, gives rational principles all the independence 
they need for realism.
66 
 
 But there is a more obvious and powerful way to press the disanalogy. In 
Aristotle's view, principles are expressive and not constitutive of the ergon of a species. 
The chestnut tree is what it is in that there is something in it that enables it to develop 
from an chestnut into a chestnut tree and then produce more chestnuts. But obviously a 
chestnut tree does not stop belonging to the kind chestnut tree should it fail to develop 
and produce chestnuts. It is just an unflourishing chestnut tree. The principle is the key to 
explaining the kind in question, but it does not completely describe it, nor is it sufficient 
for its integrity (an instance of the kind might be blighted). By contrast, Korsgaard 
attempts to make the principles constitutive in a problematically strong sense. She seems 
to think that the application of rational principles after having occupied reflective 
distance is both necessary and sufficient for engaging in the activity of reason and 
therefore for being rational. This, though, is surely is an implausible view. And as I will 
argue below it leaves no room for the idea of being more or less rational. 
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 It would be more useful for Korsgaard to draw the analogy between the activity of 
reason and some other non-organic activity. It is tempting to think of the issue in the 
following way. In a baseball game the total set of attitudes and movements that can be 
isolated in a given instant of a baseball game together with the observation of the 
constitutive principles of that game enable or produce the next time-slice of the baseball 
game. This analogy is more promising for Korsgaard's purposes: the obvious 
discrepancies that appear when drawing an analogy between the constitutive standards of 
a species-form and the constitutive principles of rational activity do not appear here.  
 But the crucial disanalogy between the baseball game and the activity of reason is 
that one can decide to not play baseball. One cannot, however, decide not to engage in the 
activity of reason, on Korsgaard's view. To do so, one has to engage in the activity of 
reason. This has unfortunate consequences for vindicating the normativity of rational 
principles. 
 There is also the outstanding question of what it is to apply a rational principle on 
Korsgaard's view. This was discussed earlier when we attempted to clarify and express 
how a rational principle determines which potential grounds are reasons. But we can also 
directly inquire into what it is to apply a rational principle. Elsewhere, Korsgaard says of 
her chosen principle of practical reason, the categorical imperative, that it “is a principle 
of the logic of practical deliberation, a principle that is constitutive of deliberation, not a 
theoretical premise applied in practical thought.” (2008, 302) We saw earlier that the 
view which suggests that to apply a principle is to take that principle or standard as the 
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content of a premise, to reason about it, leads to a regress of the sort seen in Carroll's 
“What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, or of the sort that Broome attributes to the second-
order model of reasoning. A promising way to give content to the idea of “applying a 
rational principle” that avoids such regress is, for example, simply forming the belief q 
when q follows from p. In this way, when I encounter potential ground I infer what 
follows from it and in drawing this inference (and forming the belief that follows) I 
endorse the operation of the potential ground q on me. But this doesn't show that the 
application of rational principle is a reason to form a belief that q on the basis of a 
potential ground for q, but merely shows that I am treating q as of credible rational 
authority by drawing an inference from it. But the supposed rational authority is just that 
I have drawn an inference from it, not that q itself has reasons in support of it. Q should 
have independent rational authority if I am to form beliefs on its basis by the application 
of rational principles. 
 The application of the rational principle that any belief implies itself does not help 
here, for that I can infer q from q does not thereby lend rational credibility to q (as seen 
earlier with the problem of bootstrapping). Were this Korsgaard's view, then any belief 
that is inferred from any other belief would have rational credibility (and perhaps even 
count as justified). 
 Additionally, this conception of the application of rational principles does not sit 
well with Korsgaard's general approach. For the most clear way of explaining my 
forming q because I have p and p → q is to say that I simply form q through some 
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unconscious process. But surely this suggestion is of questionable constructivist 
credibility – even to respond that one typically forms such attitudes through an 
unconscious process that could then be given rational reconstruction by the subject still 
seems to run afoul of the guiding aspiration of Korsgaard's view – it would require the 
reflective distance be given a counterfactual presentation (I could ask  “why should I see 
this reason”), which would eviscerate the point of the idea, which is to locate the source 
of normativity in the awareness characteristic of the deliberative position. 
  Korsgaard needs a conception of the application of rational principles that does 
not require these principles to be contents of reasoning (and so avoids regress) but is 
capable of lending rational credibility to a potential ground of a belief and so to that 
belief and not just which beliefs follow from it. Providing an account of what it is to 
apply a rational principle on Korsgaard's view, then, encounters much the same difficulty 
as providing an account of how the application of rational principles determines which 
potential grounds are reasons. In both cases the application of rational principles must 
take an arbitrary starting point, namely a belief that is a potential ground, but which as yet 
has no rational credibility nor basis.  
  
3.2  I will frame a second complaint about Korsgaard's conception of reason and rational 
principles in terms of the objection from diversity. It is perhaps less serious than the 
objection from incoherence, but still presents a problem for Korsgaard's view. Korsgaard 
says precious little about which are the principles of rationality. As examples she gives 
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“rules of logical inference, the principles which Kant identified as principles of the 
understanding, canons for the assessment of evidence, mathematical principles, and the 
principles of practical reason.” (2009, 3) In the foregoing discussion I have focused on a 
formation rule of natural deduction as an example (Korsgaard would agree that this 
standard falls under “rules of logical inference”, and I have simply assumed that whatever 
the final list of rational standards is, this would be among them). This objection urges that 
Korsgaard will be unable to specify the set of rational principles such that they fulfill the 
constitutive role she assigns them without deeply counterintuitive consequences. 
 There are surely a great many candidates for rational standards that fall under 
Korsgaard's brief list. It must be addressed at the outset that we have been speaking as if 
one view of logic enjoyed unequivocal support. Although the first-order predicate 
calculus and the rules of natural deduction are certainly ascendant, a variety of non-
classical logic also enjoy support as well 
 Even within the domain of deductive logic there are a plurality of rules. Of course, 
the number of principles of deductive inference can be twiddled down given the 
interdefinability of some rules and connectives. But which inductive principles are to be 
included on the list? Additionally, there are the standards of Bayesian epistemology, 
principles of decision theory (like maximin and minimax), the rules of the probability 
calculus, and so on. The objection is not, primarily anyway, that it would be 
unparsimonious for Korsgaard to admit all of the intuitive candidate rational standards 
 69 
that belong to her list to the status of rational principles.
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 Rather, the worry is that these 
standards count as rational principles only being constitutive principles of reason's 
activity. But for something to be a constitutive principle of some activity, by Korsgaard's 
own definition, one cannot fail to conform to the principle and still count as performing 
the activity in question. But given that we are of course only imperfectly rational, and 
only sometimes satisfy some of the principles on offer. Imagine, for example, one who is 
competent with deductive logic but is a systematically bad inductive reasoner – he almost 
never adheres to any of the principles of inductive inference. If Korsgaard admits 
inductive standards to the canon of rational principles, then this person does not count as 
engaging in rational activity at all. But this is surely a wildly implausible consequence. 
 She can respond to this objection by urging that the other rational standards 
mentioned are not constitutive principles. This option is unpalatable since it would 
require abandoning the normativity of these principles, which would have strikingly 
revisionary consequences. We often judge, for example, that the individual who reasons 
in accordance with the standards of inductive inference, decision theory, etc., is doing 
better than the person who is competent in only one of these domains.
68
 If we accept 
Korsgaard's constitutive view on this construal we will not be entitled to such judgments. 
 There is also the question of whether these less obvious candidates for rational 
principles fit the description for that kind. To make the case that they do, Korsgaard will 
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need to show that they play a robust unificatory role (and so are constitutive) or that they 
are related in the right sort of way to the rational principles that do. If she argues that they 
do play a unificatory role then she will have to determine which principles have priority 
(if any) and why, and will also face the problem mentioned earlier: if the set of rational 
principles includes all of our intuitive rational standards then it will be much too easy for 
one to fail to be engaging in rational activity at all (since on any view of rationality we 
only imperfectly rational). If she argues that these other principles are not rational 
principles but are related to them in the right sort way then she will have to specify the 
nature of this relation. Her best option would be to say that the non-central rational 
standards are deductively derivable from her rational principles. But we have no reason to 
think that this is so.  
 Additionally, although there is a considerable philosophical agreement about what 
should be included on the set of rational standards, empirical evidence suggests that 
people are systematically incompetent in both deductive and especially inductive 
reasoning.
69
 If these are the standards of rationality, and the activity of reason is the basis 
of distinctive human experience, then Korsgaard shoulders a great explanatory burden to 
reconcile their indispensability with empirical facts. 
 Another potential objection, but one that I will not press, is that Korsgaard must 
square her view with salient experiential aspects of the deliberative position. Although 
she draws on that position as the ground for normativity, while occupying that position 
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rational candidates (for belief or action) do not appear to be on equal footing, which they 
should if her account is correct. That is, if the potential grounds of belief or action 
become normatively charged only after being endorsed, then it should be the case that all 
considerations show up to the person deliberating as of equal weight (that is, no weight). 
But this is surely not an accurate picture of the deliberative position.  Rather, we feel 
pulled towards some considerations rather than others independent of endorsing them. I 
see that I should stop the pain being inflicted on my friend if I am able, and that I should 
do this does not seem to result from my ability to ask myself should I stop the pain being 
inflicted on my friend since it is within my power to do so and I find it objectionable?
70
   
 This itself is not a definitively damning objection, but is simply an additional 
explanatory weight for Korsgaard to shoulder. It would seem to require a reconstruction 
of the already reconstructed procedure of construction - one begins to wonder whether 
and how the law of diminishing returns applies to theoretical reconstructions. 
    
3.3  Korsgaard's is a constructivism of an odd sort. That is, there seems to be a profound 
tension at work in her account of the normativity of rational principles that can be 
expressed in the following disjunctive question: are they normative because they are 
constitutive principles of rational activity, or because we have committed (or alternatively 
“are necessitated”) to undertaking rational activity? This ambiguity is evidence of a 
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general tension in her efforts to fuse Aristotelian and so-called Kantian constructivist 
accounts of normativity. 
 In Self-Constitution she claims that her view is informed by a conception of 
normativity drawn from Aristotle. Normative principles are such because they are the 
unification of manifolds indexed to kinds. The principle that unifies a kind is normative 
for that kind, meaning that it determines whether some instance is good or bad for the 
kind in question. This, in turn, could provide an explanation of normative judgments of 
the sort we have in view: y should be A, or “why is it wrong to violate modus ponens?”. 
On some sort of an Aristotelian view
71, it can be answered that “because you are bad qua 
human being in failing to do so, since it is essential to our kind that we have the capacity 
to be rational”. This might take the form of a perfectionism which claims that insofar as 
the faculty of reason is the essential property of the kind human and that the adherence to 
and development of rational principles is the way to perfect and develop this property, it 
follows that each person is under a normative requirement to adhere to rational principles. 
 Crucially, this is a metaphysically realist picture, in which normative facts are 
fixed by the world independent of the volitional activity knower or actor. But Korsgaard 
is not a realist, so a vindication of the normativity of rationality along this general line of 
thought would be difficult to square with her commitments elsewhere. In her view an 
activity has normative force for her just in case the agent in question has committed to the 
activity. 
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 But she cannot have it both ways. You should not violate modus ponens either 
because you have committed to it, or you should not violate it because it is a feature of 
the kind to which you belong that you do not violate it. The reason why one should not 
violate modus ponens cannot be both “because modus ponens is a necessary condition for 
being an integrated rational agent with a determinate conception of the world” and the 
sort of natural normativity approach just mentioned and discussed earlier.  
 One might try and gerrymander here, urging that it is a feature of our kind that 
something is normative for us only if we have “legislated” it or committed to it. But this 
doesn't “distribute”, as it were, the normativity to both factors, but simply makes the 
normativity of rational principles a product of our commitment to the activity of reason. 
Korsgaard, then, has two options. She can argue either that rational principles are 
normative because they are constitutive principles of rational activity and so constitutive 
features of the kind to which we belong, or she can argue that rational principles are 
normative because we have committed to rational activity and they are are constitutive 
features of performing that activity. 
 The difference between the two perhaps seems subtle. To distinguish them it must 
be borne in mind that on the first proposal it is the consititutiveness of the principles for 
rational nature (which just is the activity of reason) which is essential to human kind that 
does the normative heavy lifting, on the latter it is the idea that we have committed to 
performing the activity of reason that does normative work.   
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3.4  If Korsgaard's answer to our guiding question follows the first approach, then she is 
vulnerable to the objection from the incompatibility of constitutivity and normativity.  If 
we accept her account then one cannot violate rational principles and still count as a 
rational subject – for acceptance and application of the principles is a necessary condition 
for rational activity. This makes it difficult to see how these can be normative: there is 
good reason to think that for some standard to be normative for a domain one has to be 
able to fail to uphold it and still count as having the standard apply.
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 We have seen earlier how the violation of constitutive standards, the rules of chess 
for example, do not count as chess moves at all. So one is not making a bad chess move 
or a wrong chess move in advancing the queen in an L-shaped path, but rather not a chess 
move at all. Korsgaard aims to counter this objection by relying on the notion of defect: 
the rational subject who flouts rational principles is defective qua the kind to which she 
belongs. She is a defective rational agent. The best way to flesh this out is to say that, 
staying with the example, although the move itself is not a chess move this doesn't mean 
that the player is not a chess player. Rather, it is in virtue of the illegal chess moves that 
he is a bad chess player. But what distinguishes the illegal L-shaped progression of the 
queen from the something else that is an illegal chess move, such as flicking the pawn 
like one would a football made from paper at the opponents king or swatting at the chess 
pieces with a branch? These too are not chess moves, and we do not want to say that the 
player is just a bad chess player in making them. If a bad chess player were one who 
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failed to adhere to chess rules, then I would count as a bad chess player by flicking the 
king like a paper football or beating my shoe on the chessboard as a tactic of distraction – 
there would be no principled way to draw the distinction between playing “badly” in this 
way and playing badly by always advancing one's rook in an L-shaped path. In both 
cases, this is just not playing chess at all, not being a bad chess player. I am a bad chess 
player properly so-called if I adhere to the rules of chess but very seldom (if ever) win. 
 Korsgaard might respond by urging that her understanding of defect can withstand 
this line of criticism. To do this, she might say that failing to uphold a constitutive 
principle is compatible with still falling within the domain or kind for which the principle 
is constitutive. The most plausible way to do this is to treat the principle as admitting of 
degrees of satisfaction, such that one might satisfy a principle only partially. 
Superficially, she could assign values to a range, such that I could count as adhering, for 
example, .60 to some rational principle. If I fall below some specified degree of 
satisfaction, then I will not count as a belonging to the kind or domain for which the 
principle is constitutive. This, though, is not a satisfactory response. For the only way (it 
seems to me) to give content to the notion of only partially satisfying a rational principle 
is by adhering to it in only some and not all cases. But in each specific case I will either 
adhere to the rational principle or not – so this response does not genuinely adopt the idea 
that each principle permits of degrees of satisfaction. In the cases in which I satisfy a 
principle I will count as engaging in rational activity and in those where I do not I will 
not count as engaging in rational activity (and in such cases it is not clear in what sense I 
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“should” adhere to rational principles).  
 Also, she would need to designate some value greater than .0 as the point of 
failure to satisfy the constitutive principle (otherwise there is no point in introducing a 
range system). Korsgaard might simply accept this and say that someone who satisfies 
rational principles in at least, say .5 cases, counts as engaging in rational activity. But in 
addition to the problem just mentioned, this value will be merely arbitrarily selected, and 
not only because of a line of demarcation problem. It will also be arbitrary because there 
is no normative basis to prefer one value to another given that normativity issues from the 
satisfaction of constitutive standards – to say that there is some reason or basis to prefer 
one value to another is to beg the very question at hand. The same holds true were she to 
argue that satisfaction of greater than .5 of the total constitutive rational principles at least 
some of the time (greater than .0 for each) is sufficient for engaging in rational activity 
 An account of the normativity of rationality could be refashioned into a more 
genuinely Aristotelian approach by abandoning the idea that rationality can be defined by 
a set of rules or principles. The thesis of the non-codifiability of practical reason 
characteristic to Aristotelian approaches could be extended to reason in general on this 
approach, urging that the best way to develop and perfect one's capacity for reason is in 
the development of a rational sensibility attuned to various desiderata of from the rational 
perspective (such as sensitivity to evidence, consistency, etc.) but not one codifiable in a 
set of first-order principles.  
 This view would not be attractive to Korsgaard either, especially given her 
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fundamentally Kantian orientation. In her view both theoretical and practical reason must 
be construed as governed by the application and adoption of principles, an aspect of her 
position that has its basis in what she thinks is the only available answer to the normative 
question of “why anyone should” adhere to rational principles: because we have authored 
them. 
 Another objection to the first approach is the objection from rule-following 
skepticism. If Korsgaard explains the normativity of rational principle solely in terms of 
their constitutive role then will be unable to distinguish “genuine” rational principles 
from spurious ones of the general sort presented by Saul Kripke, such as quus.
73 
Or more 
precisely, the problem for Korsgaard is not that this interpretation of her view is unable to 
answer skeptical challenges to the possibility of following a rule (for that is problem that 
effects constructivist and realist views equally), but rather that it would too easily allow 
what we have good reason to regard as spurious rational principles as normatively 
authoritative for agents. 
 Suppose that you encounter someone who has consistently applied modus ponens 
for as long as you have known him (you have seen him reason in accordance with it, that 
is), but one afternoon inexplicably infers like this (p, p → q : ~p), claiming that he has in 
fact been adhering to schmodus ponens (p, p → q : q for the first 1500 applications and 
afterwards p, p → q : ~q) all along. What distinguishes the genuine rational standard from 
the spurious one if they both fulfill the requisite unificatory role? 
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 Korsgaard will reply that they are to be distinguished by the fact that subsequent 
to the transition to non-truth preserving inference the subject will begin to become 
“disintegrated” - they do not fulfill the unificatory role. But it is not clear what this 
amounts to for rational activity. In the case of artifacts the failure to adhere to the 
constitutive standard in the production of that artifact will yield something that is bad qua 
kind (a house with drafts or leaks) or worse, not even a member of the kind (a house 
without a roof). To respond like this to the rule-following objection is tantamount to 
simply saying that if one flouts rational principles then one is bad qua rational subject. 
But Korsgaard is not entitled to this objection in the absence of standards of goodness 
and badness qua activity of reason, and constitutive principles cannot do this job.  
 But let us grant that there is some sense of disintegration for the activity of reason 
qua rational that will befall the person just mentioned. Even granting this, Korsgaard's 
response is still unsatisfactory. Instead, we can frame the objection in terms of, say, 
spring Thursday schmodus ponens. Suppose that spring Thursday schmodus ponens is a 
rule which states that every Thursday immediately following the vernal equinox one 
infers in accordance with (p, p → q : ~q) and otherwise (p, p → q : q). Surely this will do 
a good enough job “constituting” given that the first Thursday after the vernal equinox 
falls only once a year. Even supposing that a concept of rational disintegration is in view, 
this formulation of a spurious rational principle will surely not lead to it. 
 The idea of rational disintegration merits closer consideration. The organic system 
which fails to adhere to the “constitutive” principles of its kind (the honey bees that fail 
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to produce honey; the squirrel that doesn't collect nuts) will grow weak and, ultimately, 
die. It was suggested above that to respond in this general way to the rule-following 
objection without a conception of “disintegration” for rational agency in view is merely a 
metaphorical flourish for saying that one is bad qua rational agent. And this doesn't 
answer the question at hand: in virtue of what is it true to say that I should not violate 
modus ponens?  It is perfectly intelligible to have standards of goodness and badness for 
some kind yet it not be the case that one would be wrong not to satisfy the constitutive 
standards or principles that are conditions on belonging to that kind.  
 The idea of rational disintegration might seem to rest on the strength of the 
analogy between organic systems as defined by constitutive principles and the activity of 
reason as defined by constitutive principles. But perhaps we can look elsewhere. It would 
be most charitable to respond on Korsgaard's behalf by looking to her inspiration for this 
idea in the Republic, to see if the account of psychic disintegration discussed there can 
shed light on the idea of a disintegration qua rationality. Although I complained above 
that the idea of rational disintegration is merely a metaphorical flourish for suggesting 
that one should not violate the standards of rationality, the problem is not, as Murdoch  
notes, not with metaphor as such.
74
 Our intellectual lives are pervaded with metaphor, 
and to try and purge metaphor is a wrongheaded task. The problem is rather the aptness 
of the metaphor for the task at hand: specifically, the idea of disintegration does not 
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provide a satisfactory account of why we should be rational when that phenomenon is 
understood to be satisfied only in the course of as an activity that can be performed only 
by adhering to principles. 
 The transition from the aristocratic to the timocratic constitution, which would be 
analogous to the initial deviation from adherence to rational principles, might be of help 
in developing Korsgaard's point.
75 
The disintegration begins when the guardians of 
Kallipolis miscalculate the proper timing (since human life and reproduction is subject to 
a proper cycle just as vegetative life and reproduction) for pairing brides and grooms. 
This in turn leads to the birth of less excellent children to more excellent parents, and 
more excellent children to less excellent parent. Even the best of the children born in this 
time will be less than excellent guardian material, and when they become guardians they 
will let slide practices necessary for the proper maintenance of the aristocratic 
constitution, such as musical training of the best youth. As a result the guardians raised 
by these will lack the musical training that leads to harmony of temperament, and will 
instead be lead by their sense of honor or thumos rather than the rational part of the soul. 
 A first point to criticize Korsgaard here is the idea that the aristocratic constitution 
is analogous, or meant to stand for, a constitutively principle-governed constitution. 
Some commentators, for example, urge that the so-called aristocratic constitution is not 
the state of the soul that adheres to some set of principles, but rather one which is ideally 
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unified through having a proper outlook.
76
 A second point of critique is that Plato urges 
that this ideal constitution will itself decay: “not even one so constituted will last 
forever.”(2004, 546a) Plato seems to think that the aristocratic constitution, whether the 
constitution of a polis or an individual soul, cannot be maintained.   
  Although Korsgaard might claim to accommodate this point by urging that we are 
obviously imperfectly rational and so our achievement falls along a continuum, the idea 
of disintegration makes sense only to the extent that the aristocratic soul is not unified in 
virtue of the satisfaction of constitutive principles. The conception of deliberation and 
constitution to which Korsgaard helps herself in building upon Plato is not usefully 
construed as a constitutive principle-governed conception because this cannot do the 
normative work that Korsgaard needs. So looking at the source of the guiding metaphor 
fails to vindicate its aptness. The analogy is specious. 
 
3.5  Alternatively, Korsgaard can argue that rational standards are normative because we 
are committed to performing rational activity. This too can be taken in two senses, one 
expressible by the locution that we “have committed”, the other by we “are committed”. 
Either we have at some point committed to performing rational activity or we are 
committed, in the sense of being necessitated, to performing rational activity. Korsgaard 
means the second sense. She at no point references or relies upon a single explicit 
commitment which has normative authority for the agent in question, and to saddle her 
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with this view would be uncharitable. She does, however continually urge that we have 
no option but to form a conception of the world, and that the purpose of a conception of 
the world is to enable us to navigate it successfully. This commitment is reconstructed as 
rational activity. That we are so necessitated is a way for Korsgaard to give content to the 
idea that we are committed to the rational principles.  
              But this attempted vindication of the normativity of rational standards collapses 
back into incoherence. In addition to the typical objections which say that to suggest that 
reasons can be generated simply through commitment entails an implausible 
bootstrapping (mentioned above), the conception of commitment at work in Korsgaard's 
view is unhelpful. The very possibility of committing to the activity of reason, granting 
that it has the structure and nature by which Korsgaard describes it, would necessarily 
require that one engage in the activity of reason. There is no outside to the activity of 
reason that would enable one to commit to it – it is normatively barren. So on this 
approach the content of commitment in its normal sense is drained away. Above, I urged 
that this means just that we are constituted such that we engage in the activity of reason. 
But, as suggested earlier, this is a reason of the wrong kind for the normative task at 
hand, at least by Korsgaard's lights. The suggestion that we are necessitated to conform to 
the standards of rationality, yet again, is incompatible with their normativity: if we have 
no option but to adhere to rational principles, then how does it make sense to say that we 
should adhere to them?  
 A final possibility for Korsgaard is the more authentically Kantian position which 
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would say that the application of rational principles is a condition on our having 
determinate experience at all. On this view, one could not so much as have a potential 
ground of belief in view that one might transform into a reason through endorsement 
without presupposing the operation of rational principles. This view would also render 
talk of the application of rational principles misleading at best. The fully Kantian view of 
reason and rational principles would not see those phenomena as equivalent to the 
deliberative stance in the way that Korsgaard does simply because deliberation must be 
about something, and there is nothing for deliberation to be about unless rational 
principles structure the presentation of sensible content as intentional experience. On this 
view, then, the normativity of rational standard is likewise put into question – they are 
simply what it is to have awareness of objects as objects and the capacity to think about 
them, and so cannot be what makes it true that we “ought” to adhere to them or that it is 
“good” to adhere to them. 
            Korsgaard approximates this approach to the extent that one cannot exempt 
oneself from the activity of reason save by engaging in it. But even so, her account relies 
on the possibility that we can encounter our representations as potential grounds 
independent of rational principles. Korsgaard needs to provide a fuller account of 
cognition in order to illustrate how representations are formed and in virtue of what they 
are encountered as potential grounds (are there principles of cognition other than rational 
principles that do this work, or is a purely naturalistic account of the construction of 
representations her view?). But even were she to do so, her account would still be unable 
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to vindicate the normativity of rational standards without substantial revision. 
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4   CONCLUSION 
We know that we think, and we know that we can think well or think badly: we need not 
take it as an article of faith that we should think well. To the extent that she attempts to 
give an account on which it is true that one should not violate modus ponens, Korsgaard 
should be applauded. Some philosophers do not trouble themselves even this much. They 
simply take it as granted that we should adhere to rational principles, admitting of no 
explanation. Although this view is not to be rejected outright unless it is simply stated in 
the absence of some substantive account for why we have no option but to fall back to it, 
it strikes me as defeatist.  
            I hope to have shown not only that Korsgaard's account of the normativity of 
rational standards is unsatisfactory, but that her conception of reason as the most 
fundamental activity as well. The idea of constructivism served as a framing device for 
her position throughout, and although I think that it is generally correct to construe her 
position as some sort of constructivism, it is best not to criticize general positions but 
rather the details of the view in question. This is what I have tried to do. 
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